Gaza
Israel’s goal in its war in Gaza is the destruction of the Hamas-led authority, which has ruled the area since 2007, and which ordered and carried out the massacre of October 7. Tactically, again, Israel has performed well. The IDF has moved forward methodically and effectively in northern Gaza, where Hamas resistance is now only sporadic. Major operations remain in the south, to make achieving Israel’s stated goal possible.
But again, the strategic picture is less encouraging. Three contradictory timetables have been operating throughout with regard to Israel’s operation in Gaza. These are:
1. The military timetable – that is, the time that Israel needs to pursue its operation to the point where the Hamas authority has been destroyed, and efforts toward the creation of a successor authority can begin, with Israel maintaining its security hold on Gaza.
2. The diplomatic timetable – that is, the amount of time available until international pressure begins for Israel to wind up operations. The stance of the US, which historically has defended Israel for a limited period against pressure of this kind before joining it, is the crucial variable here.
3. The hostage timetable – that is, the ongoing effort to bring about the release of Israeli hostages taken on October 7.
As of now, it appears that US and Western pressure for Israel to cease the high-intensity maneuver phase of the war by early January, establish a buffer zone and continue raids and pinpointed operations into Gaza is growing. If Israel acquiesces to this, it becomes likely that Hamas will reemerge as the de facto authority in a large part of Gaza. This will be seen, justifiably, by Hamas and its supporters as victory, and motivation for further attacks.
Red Sea/Gulf of Aden/Yemen
The third conflict front that has opened up as a result of October 7 is the maritime contest taking place in the area of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea. In terms of potential global consequence, this may be the most important front of all.
As of now, the Houthis, who control northern Yemen, are engaged in a campaign of attacks on international shipping. More than a dozen ships have been targeted. Six million barrels of oil a day pass through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. About 12% of global trade transits here on the way to the Suez Canal.
As a result of the Houthis’ terrorizing of ships passing through the strait on their way to the canal, a number of major shipping companies, including MSC, Hapag-Loyd, CMA CGM, and Maersk, have announced that they have suspended passage to the Red Sea because of the threat. Energy giant BP this week recorded a similar suspension. The cost for companies of shipping to Europe via the Cape of Good Hope instead of the Suez Canal is set to have a major economic impact. Oil prices have already risen by $2.12 to $78.67 a barrel since the attacks began.
The US this week announced the formation of a 10-nation naval coalition to defend shipping in the Red Sea from attacks by the Houthis. The Houthis have said that the attacks will continue. Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a senior Houthi official, was quoted by Al Jazeera as saying that “even if America succeeds in mobilizing the entire world, our military operations will not stop… no matter the sacrifices it costs us.”
The dimensions and nature of the operations that the new coalition will take to ensure the protection of shipping in the area remain to be seen. So – three fronts of conflict in the Middle East, with a number of common factors. All three derive from the support afforded to movements of political Islam by the Islamic Republic of Iran, as part of its push for regional domination.
All three are currently at a hinge point, where it will be determined if the opponents of the Iran/Islamist side will take the necessary and determined action to push back their enemy, or if the enemy will be permitted to unilaterally reshape the strategic balance.
The outcome of all three, therefore, depends on the extent of will possessed by the anti-Iranian and anti-Islamist side. Much regarding the future of Israel and of the Middle East may depend on the results of the contest on all three of these fronts.
Post Scriptum, 7 d’abril del 2024.
Danny Citrinowicz publica aqueix anàlisi d’urgència el proppassat 3 d’aqueix mes a l’INSS: “The Elimination of the Senior Iranian General in Syria Challenges Iran’s Ability to Stay Out of the War.
Since the start of the Swords of Iron campaign, Iran has faced consecutive setbacks in Syria. The series of attacks targeting both its people and interests in the Syrian arena, starting with the assassination of Sayyed Razi Mousavi, who was responsible for transferring weapons to Hezbollah, has posed a significant challenge to Iran’s operations in Syria. However, Iran has responded to these actions in a measured and limited manner, likely out of concern within its leadership about getting entangled in the war if it carries out an overly harsh and direct response.
Nevertheless, recent events in Syria, particularly in Damascus, have been overshadowed by the assassination of General Mohammad Reza Zahedi on April 1, 2024, in the apartment adjacent to the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital. In many ways, Zahedi’s assassination is not just another attack on Iranian presence but rather a significant and almost unprecedented event in the campaign against Iran. Given Zahedi’s high rank, his connections to the Iranian leadership, and the location of the assassination near or within Iranian “territory,” Iran cannot simply ignore this incident. It’s unlikely to revert to its previous pattern of reaction.
The assassination of Zahedi further complicates the dilemma facing the Iranian leadership, as it remains apprehensive about being drawn into the “turmoil” of the war. Therefore, Iran’s leadership must carefully consider and implement a response that deters any party from carrying out similar attacks in Syria or elsewhere in the future, without directly involving Iran in the campaign. Iran fears taking any action that could escalate the war, potentially endangering its strategic assets in the Middle East, primarily Hezbollah, and even leading to a direct conflict with the United States. Simultaneously, a passive response would also expose its weakness.
Operationally, Iran, which hesitates to deploy militias in response to attacks targeting it, will need to consider whether it is appropriate to incorporate its proxies, led by Hezbollah, in its retaliatory action, in addition to the potential direct response from Iran itself. Supposedly, involving these proxies could enhance Iran’s response, but it could also put them at risk of a backlash that could escalate the conflict on the northern front.
Be that as it may, it is likely that Zahedi’s elimination will force Iran’s leadership to reconsider its involvement in Syria. The Syrian arena is strategically important to Iran for various reasons, but the series of actions against the Iranian presence, particularly the threat to key figures who are responsible for Iran’s foothold in Syria, inevitably undermines Tehran’s control over the situation in Syria and may raise doubts about its effectiveness.
The bottom line is that the elimination of Zahedi is not just another event in the campaign against Iran’s presence in Syria. Consequently, and especially given the statements issued by the Iranian leadership following the assassination, Iran, which is not hesitant to respond and also faces limitations in the Syrian context (as well as ongoing failures in carrying out attacks outside of Iran), will need to consider an innovative response that allows it to rebuild its deterrence in the northern arena without being dragged into a war. In many ways, we are not at the end of this event but rather at the beginning, and the nature of Iran’s response will directly impact the likelihood of expanding the campaign.