Gaza
Israel’s goal in its war in Gaza is the destruction of the Hamas-led authority, which has ruled the area since 2007, and which ordered and carried out the massacre of October 7. Tactically, again, Israel has performed well. The IDF has moved forward methodically and effectively in northern Gaza, where Hamas resistance is now only sporadic. Major operations remain in the south, to make achieving Israel’s stated goal possible.
But again, the strategic picture is less encouraging. Three contradictory timetables have been operating throughout with regard to Israel’s operation in Gaza. These are:
1. The military timetable – that is, the time that Israel needs to pursue its operation to the point where the Hamas authority has been destroyed, and efforts toward the creation of a successor authority can begin, with Israel maintaining its security hold on Gaza.
2. The diplomatic timetable – that is, the amount of time available until international pressure begins for Israel to wind up operations. The stance of the US, which historically has defended Israel for a limited period against pressure of this kind before joining it, is the crucial variable here.
3. The hostage timetable – that is, the ongoing effort to bring about the release of Israeli hostages taken on October 7.
As of now, it appears that US and Western pressure for Israel to cease the high-intensity maneuver phase of the war by early January, establish a buffer zone and continue raids and pinpointed operations into Gaza is growing. If Israel acquiesces to this, it becomes likely that Hamas will reemerge as the de facto authority in a large part of Gaza. This will be seen, justifiably, by Hamas and its supporters as victory, and motivation for further attacks.
Red Sea/Gulf of Aden/Yemen
The third conflict front that has opened up as a result of October 7 is the maritime contest taking place in the area of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea. In terms of potential global consequence, this may be the most important front of all.
As of now, the Houthis, who control northern Yemen, are engaged in a campaign of attacks on international shipping. More than a dozen ships have been targeted. Six million barrels of oil a day pass through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. About 12% of global trade transits here on the way to the Suez Canal.
As a result of the Houthis’ terrorizing of ships passing through the strait on their way to the canal, a number of major shipping companies, including MSC, Hapag-Loyd, CMA CGM, and Maersk, have announced that they have suspended passage to the Red Sea because of the threat. Energy giant BP this week recorded a similar suspension. The cost for companies of shipping to Europe via the Cape of Good Hope instead of the Suez Canal is set to have a major economic impact. Oil prices have already risen by $2.12 to $78.67 a barrel since the attacks began.
The US this week announced the formation of a 10-nation naval coalition to defend shipping in the Red Sea from attacks by the Houthis. The Houthis have said that the attacks will continue. Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a senior Houthi official, was quoted by Al Jazeera as saying that “even if America succeeds in mobilizing the entire world, our military operations will not stop… no matter the sacrifices it costs us.”
The dimensions and nature of the operations that the new coalition will take to ensure the protection of shipping in the area remain to be seen. So – three fronts of conflict in the Middle East, with a number of common factors. All three derive from the support afforded to movements of political Islam by the Islamic Republic of Iran, as part of its push for regional domination.
All three are currently at a hinge point, where it will be determined if the opponents of the Iran/Islamist side will take the necessary and determined action to push back their enemy, or if the enemy will be permitted to unilaterally reshape the strategic balance.
The outcome of all three, therefore, depends on the extent of will possessed by the anti-Iranian and anti-Islamist side. Much regarding the future of Israel and of the Middle East may depend on the results of the contest on all three of these fronts.
Post Scriptum, 7 d’abril del 2024.
Danny Citrinowicz publica aqueix anàlisi d’urgència el proppassat 3 d’aqueix mes a l’INSS: “The Elimination of the Senior Iranian General in Syria Challenges Iran’s Ability to Stay Out of the War.
Post Scriptum, 2 de juliol del 2024.
Herb Keinon publica aqueixa anàlisi avui al Jerusalem Post: Why isn’t the world blasting Hezbollah for this unprovoked act of war? Why isn’t there enormous pressure on the Lebanese government to rein in Hezbollah?
Post Scriptum, 14 de juliol del 2024.
Ahir, Jerusalem Post publicava aqueixa anàlisi de Mark Dubowit i Jacob Nagel, “2040: The year Iran predicts Israel will be destroyed. Now is the time to prepare. The Islamic Republic is developing a comprehensive strategy to bring about Israel’s elimination as a sovereign state”. Aqueix és l’editoral d’avui: “The world must help Israel stop Iran and its proxies, not appease them. World allies shouldn’t be fooled by the elections in Iran. Now is the time to back up Israel and ensure Tehran doesn’t achieve nuclear capabilities”.
Post Scriptum, 12 de desembre del 2024.
Ahir, a The Times of Israel, David Hiorovitz: “Israel pulls itself together; Iran’s axis falls apart. The jihadists’ lightning takeover of Syria was followed by the IAF’s vital lightning destruction of Assad’s military infrastructure. Now Iran may think it has only one option left”.