Jaume Renyer

On són els solidaris amb Palestina quan no poden acusar Israel?

El digital israelià Debka ofereix en la seva edició del proppassat dia 8 aqueix anàlisi sobre les maniobres sobre Yarmouk del règim d’Al-Assad, amb el califat Islàmic i contra els palestins (especialment contra Hamàs) en un article titulat “Assad looses ISIS against Palestians trapped in Yarmouk camp. A sinister new partnership” (traduït a l’espanyol pel blocaire jaime48):

“Obama’s rapprochement with Iran and its Middle East allies has produced an incredibly sinister new twist in the Syrian war as it enters its fifth year. The atrocity-ridden conflict finds 16,000 Palestinians trapped in horrible conditions in the Yarmouk refugee camp of Damascus and beset by two enemies: the Islamic State and the President Bashar Assad’s army.

The world has been shown three players in the vicious Yarmouk contest: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, whose jihadis are slashing through the refugee camp and massacring its Palestinian inmates, the second player, and the Syrian army, the third, which appears to be fighting to keep the Islamists from reaching central Damascus. The camp lies 8.5 km from Assad’s presidential palace.

The Islamists are usually presented as fighting to settle a score with the camp’s inmates, because the Hamas majority is aligned with Iran and Hizballah, ISIS’s deadliest foes. But even this evil scenario is not crazy enough to cover the new patchwork of alliances revealed here by DEBKAfile’s military and intelligence sources.

Syrian troops were actually directed by Assad to open the roads to Damascus and give the Islamists a free path to their Palestinian victims. This saved ISIS the need to detach substantial strength from other fronts for its Yarmouk operation.

ISIS is winning its cheapest victory yet as a result of a secret understanding reached by the Syrian president with the Islamists’ leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which evolved from their covert partnership in the oil and gas fields of eastern Syria.

When Al Baghdadi captured 90 percent of those fields last year, Assad was short of military strength to dislodge the invaders without diluting the forces fighting on more important strategic fronts, such as Damascus, the capital, Deraa in the South and Aleppo in the north. So the Syrian ruler cold-bloodedly negotiated an understanding with the ISIS caliph on four points:

1. The Syrian army and air force would abstain from attacking ISIS positions and also refrain from any effort to recapture the fields.

2. ISIS would pump out the oil and gas and transfer these products to Damascus, which would then use its distribution facilities to sell the fuel on the black market after retaining a portion for domestic consumption.

3.  Damascus and the Islamists would share out the revenue between them. Last year, ISIS was earning $2-4 million a day, an income which went far toward bankrolling the terrorist group’s war operations.

4.  Syrian power stations would keep Islamist bases supplied with electricity.

The Syrian ruler then decided, our sources report, to build on this alliance as an opportunity for another move: The outsourcing of some of his war challenges. The plan was for Assad to control from afar the action conducted by the jihadis without having to put Syrian boots on the ground. The Yarmouk operation was the first tryout of Assad’s battlefield ties with the Islamists.

The Syrian ruler had three goals in mind when he targeted the Palestinians:

 (a) To show his closest allies Iran and Hizballah that he was not totally reliant on them for war support, but retained a free hand to fight on without them. (b) To punish the Palestinian Hamas, which rules the Yarmouk camp, for withholding its support from his regime during the entire civil war.

Hamas needed to understand that the group’s reconciliation with Tehran and Hizballah did not count as absolution in Damascus. Assad had a separate accounting of his own with the Palestinian extremists.

(c)  Assad gained a new lease of life from Washington’s turnabout toward recognizing the legitimacy of his presidency (signaled by US Secretary of State John Kerry’s acceptance of Bashar Assad as part of any peace moves for Syria). He also exploited US acceptance of Iran’s expansionist designs in the region as a point in his favor.

 The Syrian ruler decided he felt confident enough to make the Palestinians his high card in his games with Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. Assad wanted them all to understand that he was riding high enough to control the fate of the Palestinians: It was up to him to decide whether to save them or throw them to the wolves – which he did by letting ISIS loose against them.”

Per la seva banda, el periodista àrab-israelià Khaled Abu Toameh publica avui mateix aqueix article al digital del Gatestone Institute explicant la indiferència dels dirigents palestins, obcecats en deslegitimar Israel més que en protegir el seu propi poble. La versió en castellà ha estat publicada pel digital “El Gran Oriente Medio” amb el títol “Por qué los palestinos de Yarmouk no tienen suerte”.

Post Scriptum, 31 d’agost del 2016.

Khaled Abu Toameh insisteix a denunciar el silenci internacional que envolta l’assassinat de més de 3.500 palestins a mans del règim sirià des del començament de la guerra multidimensional l’any 2011 en aqueix article publicat avui pel Gatestone Institute titulat “The “Other” Palestinians“.

Post Scriptum, 10 d’abril del 2018.

L’Action Group for Palestinians of Syria duu el recompte de les víctimes palestines del règim d’Al-Assad, 23 al març passat, i més de 3.600 des del començament de la guerra de Síria l’any 2011, però aqueixes morts no importen si no poden ser imputades a Israel.

Post Scriptum, 24 d’agost del 2018.

Edy Cohen publica avui un report als Perspectives Paper núemro 930, del Begin Sadat Center, titulat: “When Palestinian Blood Isn’t Equal” referit als palestins víctimes delrègim d’Al-Assad i abandonats per l’ANP i els grups jihadistes com Hamàs.

Post Scriptum, 12 d’agost del 2019.

Abans d’ahir l’Action Group For Palestinians of Syria difonia la notícia segons la qual 53 refugiats palestins fugint de Síria s’han ofegat als darrers dies davant les costes de Turquia, Grècia i Itàlia, sense que ningú alci la veu per assenyalar la responsabilitat del règim d’Al Assad.

Post Scriptum, 13 de novembre del 2019.

Bassam Tawil publica avui un article al Gatestone Institute sobre la repressió dels palestins a Síria sota el règim d’Al-Assad: “The 4.006 Paletinians the Europeans Have Not Heard Of”.

Post Scriptum, 19 de maig del 2022.

Daniel Pipes ha reproduit al seu bloc un apunt antic del seu bloc (desembre del 1986) que conserva plena actualitat: “La Palestine aux Syriens ?“, on s’hi pot llegir la pretensió del règim d’Al-Assad de representar la Gran Síria, compresa la Palestina: “En 1976, au cours d’une réunion qu’il eut avec les dirigeants de l’Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP), le président syrien Hafez al-Assad parla de la Palestine comme d’une région syrienne, plus précisément comme de la Syrie méridionale. Il dit alors aux Palestiniens : « Vous ne représentez pas la Palestine autant que nous. N’oubliez pas une chose : il n’y a pas de peuple palestinien, il n’y a pas d’entité palestinienne, il n’y a que la Syrie ! Vous faites partie intégrante du peuple syrien et la Palestine fait partie intégrante de la Syrie. C’est donc nous, les autorités syriennes, qui sommes les véritables représentants du peuple palestinien. »

Bien qu’inhabituelle dans sa candeur, cette sortie illustre une longue tradition de la politique syrienne, une tradition qui, ces dernières années [en 1986, NdT], a gagné plus que perdu en importance. Le gouvernement Assad ne se présente pas seulement comme un État arabe ayant un intérêt à protéger les droits des Palestiniens mais comme le possesseur légitime du territoire contrôlé par Israël. Puisque, selon ce point de vue, l’actuelle république de Syrie n’est qu’une partie amputée des territoires syriens, le gouvernement de Damas a le devoir de récupérer et d’unir sous son contrôle toutes les autres régions syriennes, y compris la Palestine.”

Post Scriptum, 17 de novembre del 2022.

Avui, a The Times of Israel: “Some Palestinians return to Syria’s war-battered Yarmouk camp. Syrian government opens Damascus-area camp — where some 1.2 million people lived before the 2011 civil war — for a rare visit by journalists to highlight its push for returnees”.

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