En el quart dia de guerra, el periodista de The Times of Israel David Horovitz signa aqueixa crònica: “La suffisance n’est plus de mise“. Qu’Israël ait ignoré les avertissements concernant le Hamas est impardonnable mais notre peuple est uni face à ce désastre et nos dirigeants se doivent d’assurer la victoire”. L’entrada al govern de Benny Gantz aporta legitimitat i suport social a un Netanyahu aflebit pel pes de la seva responsabilitat negligent.
El president dels EUA ha fet una declaració oficial donant suport a Israel davant l’atac estratègic per destruir l’estat hebreu. Alemanya, França i Anglaterra s’ha expressat en termes similars, conscients que l’eix Iran-Rússia és darrere del jihadisme palestí. Els dirigents jueus, com l’anterior ministra de justícia d’Israel Shaked demanen : La communauté internationale devra se souvenir que « le Hamas a agi comme les nazis », alhora que els propalestins d’arreu, com el president colombià Petro capgiren la realitat dient que Gaza és un nou Auschwitz a mans dels israelians, tot exculpant els jihadistes del seus crims.
Los hostilitats a la frontera amb el Líban han començat també, però com descriu l’analista de l’INSS Orna Mizrahi, The War in the North Will Not Resemble the War in the South: A second combat front opened by Hezbollah in the north, in parallel with the war against Hamas, will create additional challenges for Israel and change the face of the war and its results. Yet it is already clear that the war in the north, if Hezbollah chooses to join Hamas, will be entirely different from the one underway in the south for the past few days. This is for two main reasons. First, Hezbollah would not enjoy the element of surprise. Second is the fact that the IDF is prepared and ready for this possibility in the north. In recent years, the IDF has prepared for this scenario and held exercises to respond to a combined attack by Hezbollah that includes massive rocket fire on the home front and a ground attack by the organization’s commando force (the plan formulated by Hezbollah and implemented by Hamas on October 7) as part of a multi-arena campaign. In addition, a massive reserve mobilization has been underway and the assembly of Israeli forces in the north is being completed. Thus, the IDF is on full alert and ready to respond to any move by Hezbollah or even take the initiative on this front. In addition, recent painful lessons have been learned and residents of the communities near the fence in the north have already been evacuated.
Additional considerations that will affect Hezbollah’s decision making beyond the pressure exerted on it to join the fighting by Hamas (and perhaps Iran as well) are the severe damage expected to the Lebanese state, as well as to the organization and its Shia supporters following the IDF’s response. In Lebanon, the voices of criticism are already expanding about Hezbollah dragging the country into wars that are not in its interest. Another important consideration is the strengthening of Israel’s international legitimacy, which will only grow in the event of the opening of two fronts without an Israeli initiative, as already stated by President Biden and other Western leaders.”
Post Scriptum, 12 d’octubre del 2023.
L’analista de l’INSS, Eldad Shavit, hi publicà ahir aqueixa valoració: “Biden in a Historic Speech: Significance and Implications de la qual cal destacar dos punts:
• Leads an effort to ensure international support for Israel and its need to respond. Prominent in this context is the joint announcement issued by the Presidents of the US and France, the Chancellor of Germany, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, which includes an explicit commitment to act to ensure that Israel “does not run out of these critical assets to defend its cities and its citizens.” Even the European countries, which often criticize Israel’s policies, now understand that Hamas’s behavior leaves Israel no choice but to react with extreme severity.
• Sends a clear message to other actors in the Middle East, and especially (without mentioning them by name) Iran and Hezbollah, not to take advantage of the opportunity to attack Israel. Biden in his speech: “Let me say again – to any country, any organization, anyone thinking of taking advantage of this situation, I have one word: Don’t. Don’t.” The administration sent the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford and the accompanying strike group to the area, and Biden indicated that the administration is ready to transfer “additional assets” if required. Biden’s words and the US military assessments imply that beyond the desire to deter, given a real concern regarding deterioration, the administration is also willing to intervene directly to protect Israel if the war expands to other arenas.
Post Scriptum, 16 d’octubre del 2023.
La crítiques contra Israel per l’operació a Gaza no s’han fet esperar, tampoc la resposta transcrita abans d’ahir pel Jerusalem Post: “Sieging Gaza is not illegal or ‘collective punishment‘, says NJAC director. Goldfeder was tackling accusations from Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, and Peter Beinart that Israel would violate international law and norms by enacting a siege”. Avui, la jurista israeliana Pnina Sharvit Baruch clarifica els termes bàsics de la legislació internacional aplicable al conflicte en curs a Gaza en aqueix article publicar per l’INSS, “The War with Hamas: Legal Basics“.
Post Scriptum, 25 d’octubre del 2023.
Lazar Berman signa avui aqueix lúcid article a The Times of Israel: “Israël évite généralement les offensives terrestres. Cherche-t-il ici aussi une porte de sortie ? Le fait que les chars sont toujours en Israël, 17 jours après le massacre du Hamas, pose question et laisse penser que cette guerre ressemble aux offensives peu concluantes du passé”. Però, l’anàlisi més punyent és el de David Horovitz: “Hamas, unthinkably, remains potent, still hurting Israel practically, psychologically. Empathy and support for an Israel in its darkest hour are dissipating, in a war that we don’t want to define as existential but that is looking increasingly so”.
Post Scriptum, 28 d’octubre del 2023.
Gérard Chaliand, especialista en guerres asimètriques i geoestratègia analitzà abans d’ahir a Le Figaro els reptes de l’ofensiva terrestre a Gaza: «Du côté du Hamas, il y a un désir de faire saigner l’adversaire».
Post Scriptum, 28 de novembre del 2023.
Editorial del Jerusalem Post d’avui: “Finish the job“. This editorial is being written on the fourth day of the temporary pause in fighting between Israel and Hamas that is meant to facilitate the release of Israeli hostages being held by the Palestinian terrorist group in Gaza.
Reports throughout the day indicated that Israel had identified “an issue” with the list of women and children Hamas has offered to release Monday evening – potentially, Israeli media reported, a violation of the understanding that children would not be separated from their mothers as part of the process. Qatari and Egyptian mediators worked throughout the day to resolve the issue and prevent a delay in the hostages’ release. This last group of 11 brings the total number of Israeli hostages released over the four days of the pause to 51.
Hamas announced on Sunday that it would like to extend the pause for additional days. Israel, for its part, would only contemplate such an extension if it received assurances that Hamas will free additional hostages – reportedly ten per day.
In exchange, Israel will presumably release additional Palestinian security prisoners from Israeli jails, by the established ratio of three to one, and will allow additional aid trucks into Gaza. It will also, of course, hold off on its military campaign against Hamas.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made his government’s position clear in a call with US President Joe Biden on Sunday. “We brought back another group of hostages this evening – women and children, and we are moved from the depths of our hearts, the entire nation, when we see this reuniting of families. It simply stirs the soul,” he said in a statement that evening.
“I have just spoken with President Biden with great emotion, also over little Avigail [Idan], of course. What a joy it is to see her with us, But, on the other hand, how sad it is that she is returning to a reality in which she has no parents. She has no parents – but she has an entire nation that embraces her, and we will take care of all her needs,” he said. “Beyond this, I would like to say that there is also an outline that says that it is possible to release an additional ten [hostages] each day. That would be welcome.”
Late Monday evening, Qatari and US officials announced that the sides had agreed to extend the pause by a further two days. Hamas will now reportedly release another 20 hostages. It has also notably announced its willingness to negotiate the release of abducted Israeli soldiers.
While there are questions about how many hostages Hamas can actually produce – dozens, if not more, are reportedly being held by other terrorist groups and perhaps even private individuals in Gaza – so long as the group is indeed able to hand over hostages, Israel should keep this arrangement going, provided it does not impair the IDF’s ability to continue the military campaign once the pause ends.
Israel launched this campaign with two stated goals: toppling Hamas and bringing the hostages home. Military leaders had been supportive of the initial four-day pause in hostilities, saying that not only would it not undermine the army’s ability to continue its efforts against Hamas – it would actually facilitate them. This appears to hold true for the additional two days, as well.
In Israel’s understanding, its two goals are mutually reinforcing: it is the military campaign against Hamas that applied the pressure necessary to force the group to start freeing the hostages – and it is the release of the hostages and the transfer of humanitarian aid to Gaza in the context of the deal that will enable the campaign against Hamas to continue once the pause concludes. Our message is simple: Israel should finish the job: Both jobs.
Israel should continue to do whatever is necessary – and within the bounds of what its military leaders determine is bearable – to free the hostages so long as the pause continues, and it should be prepared to immediately relaunch its military effort to eradicate Hamas’s capacity to carry out a massacre like October 7 ever again. In so doing, Israel’s leaders will fulfill their commitment to the people of the Jewish state and bring this painful episode to its natural conclusion.Post Scriptum, 26 de desembre del 2023.Ron Ben-Yishai publicà el proppassat dia 3 aqueix artile a YnetNews, “Israel’s roadmap to triumph: 5 key steps for overcoming Hamas. Victory requires translating political slogans into action: impacting Hamas leadership, dispersing their forces, dismantling control and logistics, weakening civilian police and destroying institutions; with correct action, Israel can win with international support”.
Post Scriptum, 18 de febrer del 2024.
L’analista Why Israel Is Winning in Gaza”.
Anyone who has ever been in combat knows that the enemy is almost always invisible, because to remain alive one must remain behind good cover: The one and only time I saw live enemies walking toward me, I was so astonished that I hesitated before opening fire (ill-trained, they were walking into a blinding sun).
It is the same in urban combat, but much worse because the invisible enemy can be a sniper behind a window—and any one of the countless apartment houses in Gaza has dozens of windows—or he can wait with an RPG at ground level to pop out and launch his rocket, whose short range makes it of little use in open country but is amply sufficient across the width of a street. Mortars, which launch their bombs parabolically in an inverted U, are exceptionally valuable in urban combat because they can attack forces moving up one street from three streets away, beyond the reach of immediate counterfire.
Finally, there are mega-mines: not the standard land mines with five to 10 kilos of explosives placed on the ground or just under, but wired demolition charges with 10 times as much explosive covered over with asphalt, to be exploded when a tank, troop carrier, or truckload of soldiers is above them.
That is why, from the start of Israel’s counteroffensive into Gaza, almost all the media military experts, including colonels and generals festooned with campaign ribbons (though few if any had ever seen actual combat) immediately warned that Israel’s invasion of Gaza could not possibly defeat Hamas, but would certainly result in a horrifying number of Israeli casualties, before resulting in a bloody and strategically pointless stalemate.
And that was before it was realized that there were hundreds of miles of tunnels beneath Gaza, from which fighters could emerge from invisibility to attack advancing soldiers from the rear, or to set up instant ambushes in apparently cleared terrain, and through which encircled fighters under attack could safely escape. In the special case of Gaza, moreover, the crowded urban battlefield offers endless opportunities for the easiest of tactics, because contrary to accusations that only expensively educated U.S. college students could possibly believe, Israeli soldiers do not deliberately kill innocent civilians going about their business. Therefore Hamas fighters can be perfect civilians walking alongside women and children right up until the moment they duck into the right doorway to take up prepared weapons and come out shooting.
Yet as of now, after 124 days of fighting in both Gaza and in the north against Hezbollah, a total of 562 Israeli soldiers have died—a total that includes 373 soldiers and local security officers, who died on Oct. 7 itself, when any and all immediately available soldiers—only some of them as organized units—rushed in to fight Hamas infiltrators wherever they could find them. Even a single death is immensely tragic for an entire family, and quite a few are entrepreneurs with employees who depend on them, so that every single death gravely affects many in many ways.
That must be said and emphasized before adding that the actual number of Israeli soldiers killed in the counteroffensive until now is not in the thousands suggested by the beribboned skeptics who were gleefully echoed by the malevolent, but under 300 as of this writing. In other words, only a very, very small number, given the magnitude of the forces involved on both sides, and the exceptional complexity of the battlefield. By way of comparison, 95 U.S. Marines and four British soldiers were killed in the six-week-long, 2004 battle of Fallujah, the famous Pumbedita of the Talmudists but a small town, fighting some 4,000 Sunni fighters. In Gaza, estimates are that Israel faced approximately 30,000 trained Hamas fighters at the start of the war.
Regardless of what happens from now on, the Gaza fighting to date has been an exceptional feat of arms. A conservative estimate—the lowest I have seen—is that approximately 10,000 Hamas fighters have been killed or terminally disabled, along with an equal number of wounded who may or may not fight again in the future.
The sensational 1 to 50, or near enough, kill ratio achieved by the IDF in fighting Hamas in Gaza is all the more exceptional for reasons that neither official Americans nor official Israelis care to mention, albeit for different reasons.
The first is tactical and technical. Without saying more, it is fair to conclude from news accounts that Israel’s very innovative methods to surveil, penetrate, and destroy Hamas tunnels have been markedly and unexpectedly successful.
But the constraints placed on Israel’s combat operations have been very severe, and a major impediment to its fight. Israel has a fair amount of field artillery in the form of the common 155 mm caliber gun-howitzers, just like the U.S. and other Western armies. But it also has much smaller, much cheaper Israeli-made 160 mm heavy mortars that deliver 30 kilos of high explosives at shorter ranges. The Israelis should have used them abundantly in the Gaza fighting, because parabolic fire is just the thing in urban warfare, but did not because of their own avoidance of collateral casualties … and because of continued alarms and warnings from the U.S.
That was most certainly the case with the exceedingly restrained, indeed inadequate use of Israel’s air power in Gaza. In the 1991 “Desert Storm” attack on Iraq, for which I received a letter of commendation from U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Merrill A. McPeak for target selection before and during the bombing, I never deliberately selected a civilian target. But I do not recall anyone ever telling me that a valuable military target must not be attacked because there may be civilian casualties. But in Gaza, the Israeli air force was hardly allowed to contribute more than a fraction of its strength to the fighting, in deference to the insistent requests coming from the White House.
All this makes the Israeli success in the fighting to date all the more remarkable. One reason is known to all: The Israeli army remains wedded to the British method of intensive and prolonged individual instruction for its soldiers before their in-unit training, so that nobody enters Gaza without at least a full year’s worth of combat instruction, much more than their American counterparts had in Vietnam when the U.S. last used conscripts.
Another reason is that the IDF did not fall into the illusion that normal infantry soldiers, howsoever well-trained, could venture into invariably booby-trapped and deviously interlinked Hamas tunnels and fight successfully. More than 25 years ago, the IDF established its Yahalom (an acronym that means “diamond” in Hebrew) combat engineer unit that specializes in tunnel warfare to learn all its many tricks and perils, so that when a new tunnel entrance is discovered in Gaza by advancing troops there is no rushing in Israeli-style, until Yahalom soldiers arrive to lead the way, very carefully. By substituting low-frequency sensors, heavy earth-moving equipment, minidrones, and bullets for jet fighters, heavy artillery, and smart bombs, Israel has effected massive cost savings while reducing its reliance on U.S. resupply—and taking the steam out of propaganda claims about bombing and artillery massacres.
Finally, there is the equipment much of it unique to the IDF, and already in high demand by foreign armies. Israeli Merkava tanks, unlike the seemingly formidable German Leopard tanks that failed to spearhead Ukraine’s big offensive, were not penetrated and cooked by the remarkable Russian Kornet missiles that Hamas also has. That’s because, in addition to its thick armor, each 60-ton Merkava went into Gaza with its own Trophy counterweapon that intercepts incoming missiles and rockets at close range.
Also unique to Israel is the turretless Namer infantry carrier, a battle taxi in effect, that allows Israeli troops to move about in the perilous urban space protected by more armor than any combat vehicle in history. When armored vehicles enter defended urban areas they must do so almost blindly, because their commanders cannot stand in their turrets to look all around, as they do in open ground, without fatally exposing themselves to close-in artillery and mortars, and also snipers. Yes, there have always been observation slits, periscopes and protected sights but they only offer narrow views, of little use when a hundred windows and balconies overlook the fight.
In the Namer by contrast, nobody has to stand in an open hatch to view all 360 degrees of the outside world, because the locked-down crew can see everything on large screens whose images come from microcameras safely embedded in the armor.
Even when Israel’s infantrymen in Gaza must dismount, or advance on foot from the start, they are guided by the warnings and directions of their commanders, who monitor their movement and those of any enemies close by with the cameras of their minidrones that can see them from above, while other flying cameras look for snipers and for mortar crews in the next street over. While these days even Iran manufactures drones, Israel was the first country to produce remotely piloted vehicles as they were originally known some 60 years ago, and still today leads the way, producing both the smallest—mechanical flying insects—and some of the largest. They are especially useful in Gaza because it takes many eyes to surveil the very complicated urban landscape.
None of the above would matter if the troops fighting in Gaza were not determined to ensure that they will not have to come back, by fighting as hard and as long as necessary to grind down Hamas until nothing is left of its fighting strength. Of that the best evidence is provided by a misunderstanding: The soldiers of a reserve battalion of several hundred, rotated out after much hard fighting to bring in a fresh battalion, mistakenly thought that Israel was starting to retreat altogether, and staged a protest until they were reassured—and also reprimanded—for protesting while still in uniform.
It is now evident that the tactical victory that Hamas achieved on Oct. 7 with all its scenes of unimaginable horror has become a leading driver of its strategic defeat, by compelling the Israeli government to persist in spite of the atrocious plight of the hostages, by motivating IDF troops to fight until its destruction, and by forfeiting much potential support even from within the Arab world, allowing all Arab governments that had them to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. That feckless American college students sing its praises will not avert the well-deserved fate that awaits Hamas, and without the heavy casualties that some feared while others gleefully anticipated.
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