En una primera anàlisi des del punt de vista israelià, la reacció de Xina arran de l’atac gihadista del proppassat 7 d’octubre hom creia que: “The War in Gaza has Damaged China’s Standing in the Middle East“, segons escrivia Galia Lavi a l’INSS el 6 de novembre de l’any passat. Però, la realitat és ben bé una altra, l’hostilitat del règim comunista xinès contra Israel, com exemplifica aqueixa informació publicada per Yedioht Ahronoth el proppassat 24 de desembre: “La alta tecnología israelí acusa a China de sanciones ocultas. Desde el comienzo de la guerra, Beijing dificultó el envío de componentes. Las consecuencias a las que se enfrenta la tecnología israelí”.
Després d’una dècada d’esforços israelians per establir lligams amb Xina i permetre que conpanyies xineses invertissin en sectors clau de l’economia d’Israel, el règim comunista es regira violentament contra l’estat jueu en l’època post 7 d’octubre, així ho explica Itamar Eichner avui al Jerusalem Post: “The unraveling of Israel’s China strategy post October 7”. Beijing not only blocks UN condemnation of Hamas but also champions pro-Palestinian policies; Israel confronts disillusionment after a decade of growing economic ties following unheeded warnings about China’s control of its critical infrastructure.
Post Scriptum, 10 de gener del 2024.
Ahir, Jacob Megid escrigué a The Times of Israel: “Depuis le 7 octobre, la Chine laisse l’antisémitisme se propager sur Internet”. Per la seva part dels analistes de l’INSS Israel Ori Sela i Assaf Orion publicaren aqueix report: “China and the Houthis: Sounds of Silence“.
Post Scriptum, 27 de febrer del 2024.
Ofir Dayan va publicar abans d’ahir aqueix article breu, però contundent, a l’INSS d’Israel: “China’s Cynical Approach to the Middle East Is Clarified in One Article”.
Last week, on February 20, the Chinese ambassador to Israel, Cai Run, published an article in the Israel Hayom newspaper, in honor of the Chinese New Year—the Year of the Dragon. The ambassador devoted most of the article to his insights regarding the Chinese economy, insights that his country is interested in “sharing with our friends in Israel,” those friends who have been fighting a cruel enemy that the ambassador and his country have not yet condemned for five months. According to the ambassador, China is a stabilizing factor in the world economy despite the “headwinds it faces,” thereby, of course, hinting at the United States and Western countries who have long been talking about reducing their dependence on China.
The ambassador addresses a number of audiences in Israel, hinting at the priorities of his administration. First, he turns to “talents” in the fields of technology and says that China invests a lot in R&D and high-tech. The ambassador then addresses the Israeli investors, to whom he tells about the high returns for foreign investments in his country and the openness to which China is committed; but he forgets to mention China’s economic difficulties and the investigations and harassment that Western companies have experienced in recent years.
As much as the ambassador’s absolute attention to economic matters is striking, the lack of discourse on other issues is even more. While Cai Run foresees a “bright future” for the relationship between the countries, he forgets the present, in which China backs the Palestinians and calls Israel’s actions “beyond self-defense” and “collective punishment.”
The ambassador’s article raises questions as to whether the Palestinians will be happy to find out that China still sees itself as a friend and an important trade partner of Israel despite unequivocal messages of support they’ve received from the Chinese leadership. This article once again proves China’s cynical approach to the Middle East—publicly it is with the Palestinians, but its main interest is economic, and therefore it will continue to prioritize its relations with Israel.
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