Jaume Renyer

per l'esquerra de la llibertat

3 d'abril de 2024
0 comentaris

Iran vol obrir un nou front contra Israel tot desestabilitzant Jordània

L’institute for the Study of the War publica diàriament l’estat de la situació dels conflictes entre Rússia i Ucraïna, Taiwan i Xina i l’eix iranià contra Israel. Ahir, pel que fa aqueix darrer aportava la següent novetat: A prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia threatened to create and arm a new Iranian proxy in Jordan, which may reflect a greater, more confrontational, shift in the Iranian strategy vis-a-vis Jordan.

Kataib Hezbollah military spokesperson Hussein Moanes, also known as Abu Ali al Askari, said on April 1 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed militias, has prepared to “equip” 12,000 “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with a significant supply of weapons.[1] The mention of an Islamic resistance network in Jordan is a notable inflection, as Iranian and Iranian-backed actors have not previously mentioned the existence of such an entity. Moanes said that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq seeks to equip Jordanian fighters, so that Iraq and Jordan can jointly attack Israel to ”defend” the Palestinian cause. Kataib Hezbollah released the statement in response to an Israeli airstrike in Damascus on April 1, which killed seven Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) members.[2] Moanes’ statement is likely aspirational given the current strength of the Jordanian armed forces and the operational costs and time required to create a pro-Iran network in Jordan.

Kataib Hezbollah’s choice to publicize its desire to set up a large armed militia indicates a growing Iranian interest in using Jordan in its anti-Israel campaign, however. Jordan offers a direct front from which Iranian-backed fighters could more easily conduct and direct attacks into Israel. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq already utilizes Jordanian airspace for its drone attacks into Israel.[3] An active and well-armed Iranian-backed militia based out of Jordan would dramatically advance Iran’s military encirclement of Israel.

An expanding Axis of Resistance network in Jordan would also facilitate Iranian efforts in the West Bank. Jordanian territory also offers multiple ground routes through which Iran could move military materiel into the West Bank. Tehran has sought to develop the capabilities and infrastructure of its militia network in the West Bank in recent years, but the Israel-Hamas war has highlighted the shortcomings of the networks there.[4] Palestinian militias in the West Bank remain relatively disorganized and still use rudimentary capabilities to attack Israel and Israeli forces compared to the militias in the Gaza Strip. Iranian leaders could conclude that they need to invest further in building their networks into Jordan to develop their militia infrastructure in the West Bank more effectively.

Moanes’ separately declared that Kataib Hezbollah would “cut off” land routes that “reach” Israel.[5] Kataib Hezbollah may be referring to the transportation line connecting ports in the Persian Gulf to Israel via Saudi Arabia and Jordan.[6] A likely Iranian-backed militia drone exploded on the Jordan-Israel border near Eilat on April 2, near where trucks carrying Israeli goods from the Gulf States enter Israel via Jordan.[7] CTP-ISW is unable to confirm the drone’s target. However, the location is notable because Israel has increasingly relied on this land route to compensate for reduced trade activity through Eilat due to the Houthi’s anti-shipping campaign.[8] The Houthi movement has emphasized that its drone and missile campaign seeks to create a blockade that will destroy the Israeli economy and analogized ongoing Houthi operations to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which Egypt seized Israeli shipping near the Bab al Mandeb.[9] Kataib Hezbollah attacks targeting this land route would support the Houthis’ efforts.

Recent domestic unrest and large sustained demonstrations in Jordan against the Jordanian government’s Israel policy may be driving Iran and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq to approach Jordanian infiltration differently and more overtly. Thousands of Jordanians have demonstrated in front of the Israeli embassy in Amman since March 24.[10] The protestors have called for the Jordanian government to cut diplomatic ties with Israel, withdraw from the 1994 peace treaty, and cut off the trade route between the Persian Gulf and Israel that cuts through Jordanian territory.[11] Protestors have repeatedly clashed with Jordanian security services, and the government has accused groups of stirring up ”strife.”[12] Protestors have also expressed support for Hamas and called for armed resistance against Israel.[13]  Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s leaders have praised the Jordanian protest movement as an important part of resistance against Israel.[14] The Jordanian state’s strong security apparatus, high degree of domestic control, and close relationship with the US military are significant obstacles for Kataib Hezbollah or other Iranian-backed actors if they choose to develop a network in Jordan.

Post Scriptum, 4 d’abril del 2024.

En el report fet públic ahir, l’ISW amplia la informació: Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have signaled their desire to disrupt the “land bridge” connecting Israel to the Persian Gulf. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Secretary General Akram al Kaabi criticized the “land bridge,” which passes through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, in a speech on April 3.[1] Kataib Hezbollah military spokesperson Hussein Moanes similarly declared on April 1 that the group is prepared to arm Iranian-backed militants in Jordan and “cut off” land routes that reach Israel.[2]

The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ desire to disrupt the “land bridge” is likely part of a larger Axis of Resistance effort to economically isolate Israel. These threats come as Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have repeatedly called for Muslim countries to institute a blockade on Israel.[3] Iranian state media similarly has criticized countries that have allowed Israel to conduct trade through their territory.[4] Iranian state media has further argued that the “land bridge” renders Houthi attacks targeting Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea “ineffective.”[5] Israel has increasingly relied on the Israeli-UAE overland trade route to compensate for reduced trade activity at the Port of Eilat due to the Houthis’ anti-shipping campaign.[6] The Houthis have conducted over 40 attacks targeting commercial vessels in the Red Sea since November 2023.[7] Vessel traffic through the Red Sea has declined by approximately 50 percent since January 2024 due to Houthi attacks.[8]

Kaabi separately discussed the West Bank, Israeli settlers, and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba operations in his April 3 speech. Kaabi claimed that Israel is “confused” by the “emerging Palestinian resistance” in Jerusalem and Bethlehem.[9] Kaabi also claimed that Israeli settlers are “returning to their countries of origin” because they feel unsafe in Israel.[10] This claim is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Iranian leaders seek to stoke economic, political, and security turmoil in Israel to facilitate Israeli citizens’ emigration [11] Kaabi lastly claimed that Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba will “expand” its attacks if the IDF continues operating in the Gaza Strip and reiterated the militia’s commitment to removing US forces from Iraq.[12]

Per altra banda The Times of Israel explica: “Shaken by daily mass protests on Gaza, Jordan accuses ‘infiltrators’ of stoking unrest. The Hashemite kingdom has been one of Israel’s most vocal critics, but the Jordanian public is dissatisfied with the government’s rhetoric and many demand an end to the peace treaty”.

Post Scriptum, 12 d’abril del 2024.

Mordechai Kedar, avui al Jerusalem Post: “Overthrowing Jordan and courting Azerbaijan: Iran’s master plan for the region. The Azerbaijanis will never let down their guard, they too were part of the Safavid Empire and can play chess every bit as well as the Iranian mullahs”.

Deixa un comentari

L'adreça electrònica no es publicarà. Els camps necessaris estan marcats amb *

Aquest lloc està protegit per reCAPTCHA i s’apliquen la política de privadesa i les condicions del servei de Google.

Us ha agradat aquest article? Compartiu-lo!