Jaume Renyer

Avui s’ha fet pública la decisió del fiscal del Tribunal Penal Internacional demanant l’emissió d’ordres de recerca i captura contra el president d’Israel i el ministre de defensa, així com de tres líders gihadistes palestins. Aqueix malpas serà un més en el descrèdit dels organismes internacionals bastits per presevar els drets humans ja que situa al mateix nivells els genocides i els governants d’un estat democràtic. Agreujarà l’antisemitisme global i la criminalització d’Israel alhora que apuntalarà el palestinisme com a factor de convergència de tots els totalitarismes que volen l’erradicació de l’estat-nació del poble jueu i la derrota de les societats obertes occidentals.

La resposta israeliana més coherent és aqueixa de Benny Gantz, reproduïda per The Times of Israel: “« Alors qu’Israël se bat avec l’un des codes éthiques les plus stricts de l’Histoire, tout en respectant le droit international et en s’enorgueillissant d’un système judiciaire indépendant et solide, établir un parallèle entre les dirigeants d’un pays démocratique déterminé à se défendre contre un terrorisme abject et les dirigeants d’un groupe terroriste sanguinaire constitue une profonde distorsion de la justice et une faillite morale flagrante ». Aqueixa infàmia jurídicament indefensable no aturarà la determinació d’Israel per defensar-se i preservar la supervivència del poble jueu arreu del món.

Post Sciptum, 1 de juny del 2024.

La proposta d’alto-el-foc del president Biden suposa deixar Hamàs al poder a Gaza, fa Israel més vulnerable i aïllat i com a molt serà una treva temporal pels enemics que cerquen la destrucció de l’estat-nació del poble jueu. Comparteixo el parer de Seth  J. Frantzman avui al Jerusalem Post:  Who can declare victory if a ceasefire would leave Hamas in power? 

Post Scriptum, 3 de juny del 2024.

La proposta de treva  del president Biden, tot i ser ben mesurada no serà acceptada per Hamàs ni per l’eix iranià, car l’objectius d’aquests és la destrucció d’Israel, no pas una solució de dos estats. Per això, Israel ha de persistir en la lluita contra els gihadistes que ocupen Gaza i preparar-se per fer front a Hezbol·là a la frontera nord. Comparteixo el parer de l’analista de l’INSS d’Israel Udi Dekel: “It Is Possible to Defeat Hamas“.

There are those who argue, even firmly, that Hamas cannot be defeated. Indeed, it is difficult to annihilate an organization like Hamas, which relies on its foundation of being a social movement and espouses a rigid, extreme religious-nationalist ideology, in addition to having an armed military wing. But it is possible to greatly reduce Hamas’s influence among the public that it purportedly represents and leads, by denying its power to inflict damage and the veto power that it held and still holds.

This requires six combined efforts:

1. 1. Military effort: The operative dismantling of Hamas’s military wing should continue for a while, even after the war officially ends, to ensure that the organization cannot reestablish itself and restore its military power. The purpose of the ongoing military campaign is to prevent Hamas from being able to torpedo the political and civilian measures aimed at stabilizing the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian arena in general after the war.

1. 1. Civilian effort: Wherever it is possible to begin stabilizing and reconstructing the Gaza Strip, an official responsible for civilian control and public order should be appointed, and this measure should be implemented while preventing Hamas’s intervention and involvement. For example, Israel can still stabilize the northern part of the Gaza Strip, allow local authorities to operate, while removing Hamas-affiliated officials, and signal to the residents of the area that they can return and rehabilitate without fear from the organization.

1. 1. Political effort: Together with the United States and the pragmatic Arab states, a task force should be built to revive and reform the Palestinian Authority and help it establish civilian control in the Gaza Strip. To gain the support of the residents of Gaza, the PA should return to the Strip accompanied and supported by the Arab states and the international community that will be expressed in part by reconstruction packages for the residents. However, it is essential to avoid promoting too soon far-reaching initiatives such as the establishment of a Palestinian state. These kinds of initiatives will become feasible only after the connection between October 7 and the establishment of a Palestinian state is severed, and after the reformed PA proves that it can indeed run a state.

1. 1. Integration and cooperation with the moderate Arab states: Normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel is the driving force leading the way, with active American involvement. The regional balance of power has not been reversed yet, as all the countries that have signed peace or normalization accords with Israel are maintaining their ties, despite Israel’s declining assets. However, for Israel to mobilize support and involvement in establishing a reformed and moderate Palestinian regime and in reconstructing the ruins of Gaza, it is necessary to support President Joe Biden’s initiative to change the regional architecture. This initiative includes four paths: (1) Establishing an expanded security alliance with Saudi Arabia, which will also involve normalization with Israel; (2) A US-led initiative to launch a political process aimed at establishing a demilitarized Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that does not pose a security threat to Israel, provided that its control and security structures are thoroughly established; (3) Formulating a regional alignment led by the United States to counter Iran’s negative influence throughout the Middle East; and (4) Creating an economic corridor from India to the Arabian Gulf and from there to the Mediterranean, that will promote economic growth and prosperity for all the pragmatic states in the region.

1. 1. Humanitarian effort: Aid to the population of the Gaza Strip should be expanded while preventing Hamas from taking control of the aid and distributing it according to its own interests. In order to regain international legitimacy, Israel must demonstrate that it is not punishing the residents of the Strip but is focused on dismantling Hamas.

1. 1. Cognitive effort: In order to neutralize Hamas’s influence on the residents of the Gaza Strip—with neither fear nor hope—it is crucial to prevent any notion of integrating Hamas into the Palestinian system of governance and to prevent it from following the model of Hezbollah—of gaining political influence based on an independent military, which would undermine the ability of the PA to maintain a monopoly on weapons and realize President Mahmoud Abbas’s vision of “one authority, one law, one gun.”

Although there may still be occasional activity of Hamas terrorist cells, it is possible to render them insignificant in the Palestinian arena if Israel can implement the above efforts as a cohesive and synchronized system.

Post Scriptum, 3 de juliol del 2024.

Avui, Seth J. Frantzzman al Jerusalem Post:  “Dead or alive, Deif symbolizes the overall Hamas problem“.

Israel targeted Hamas commander Mohammad Deif in an airstrike on Saturday. He was located in the Mawasi area of southern Gaza, which was designated as a humanitarian zone early in the war. Whether or not Deif is dead may not be that important. If he is dead, it will have removed a key commander who has had the unique ability to elude targeted strikes in the past. Al-Ain media in the UAE referred to him as a “ghost” who has nine lives, for instance.

The problem with Deif is that he was able to become so powerful in the first place. Israel has eliminated a number of Hamas commanders and leaders in the past, including Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Rantisi, Salah Mustafa Muhammad Shehade, and others during the Second Intifada, for instance. Saleh al-Arouri and Marwan Issa were eliminated after October 7. It’s not entirely clear how much of a setback this has been for Hamas. The organization has replaced leaders in the past, and it also assumed after October 7 that it would lose most of the leaders in Gaza.

However, Hamas has insulated itself well from major repercussions for October 7. This is the wider problem that Deif represents in a sense. Because Deif is never seen in public and has existed as a kind of “ghost” for so long, it’s possible to assume that the real story of Hamas is not found in its murderous leaders in Gaza or their battalion and brigade commanders.

Israel already believes it has eliminated sixty percent of the Hamas fighters that existed in October. Most Hamas battalions have supposedly been defeated. Yet the organization persists. Its leadership lives in Doha in Qatar. Doha is a key US ally in the region. The fact that Hamas was able to murder more than 1,000 Jews, the most killed in a single attack since the Shoah and Hamas leaders live in luxury in a US and Western ally tells us a lot more about Hamas than Deif’s death might tell us.

This is because Hamas planned October 7 as part of a wider war on Israel. It is a war backed by Turkey, a member of NATO, and also by Doha, Tehran, Moscow, Beijing, and many other countries. Hamas has systematically used UN facilities in Gaza, primarily UNRWA facilities. Its members also work for international NGOs and partner with them. Hamas has bought their silence, such that they don’t condemn Hamas or even mention it in statements. They call it an “armed group.” When Deif was killed, major media in the West called him a “military chief.”

How can Deif be a “military chief” if he never appears in public and doesn’t wear a uniform? Yet Western media portrays him as if he has the same rank as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the US or a key general in the UK or Germany. “Military chief” would refer to that rank in any other conflict.

When the US targeted Osama Bin Laden or ISIS leader Baghdadi, the Western press didn’t call them “military chiefs.” Only Hamas gets this privilege. It is a unique privilege and represents another aspect of the Deif problem.

Hamas members dress as civilians. When they are killed, the Hamas-run health ministry in Gaza calls them all civilians. Yet they are called “military chiefs” by Western media. They are both civilians in death and military chiefs and “armed groups.” At each juncture, Hamas gets all the privileges.

The privilege to hide in UN schools, the privilege to hide in a humanitarian zone, and to also pretend to be a “military” even though it systematically massacres civilians and has destroyed Gaza over the last decades of its illegal, criminal rule.

This is the Deif problem. If Hamas was just Deif, then it could be eliminated by killing off its commanders and destroying it bit by bit. But it is not just Deif. It is Deif, the “military chief,” and also Deif, the civilian, and Deif, the “armed group” leader. Hamas leaders live abroad in luxury, backed not just by Western allies but also by Russia, China, and Iran. Hamas is also treated as a kind of proxy against Israel by Western progressives, who call it “resistance.” Therefore, Deif is also the ”resistance.”

Israel also has a Deif problem because it allowed most of these Hamas leaders to thrive for so long. Most of them could have been eliminated decades ago. Many of them were in fact imprisoned by Israel at one time or another and then released in previous deals. Israel has always allowed Hamas to survive, in some form, either due to negligence, ignorance of the Hamas threat, or even cynical decisions at the top that thought Hamas might balance the Palestinian Authority.

This enabled Hamas to become a massively powerful genocidal group that carried out on October 7. Deif enjoyed the privilege of enabling this monstrous attack. For too long, he has had that privilege, and Hamas has not felt hunted like Bin Laden or Baghdadi were. Even if Deif is dead, the Hamas leaders openly relax abroad. There are no consequences for them.

The International Criminal Court applied for an arrest warrant against Deif. The ICC mentioned him, alongside Yahya Sinwar and Doha-based Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, and accused them of bearing “criminal responsibility for the following war crimes and crimes against humanity committed” on October 7.

If Deif is dead, then someone will need to confirm that and tell the ICC that one war criminal genocidal mastermind can be removed from the docket. Either way, the Deif problem will continue.

Israel has been fighting for nine months in Gaza. Deif should have been eliminated long ago, along with the rest of the monstrous genocidal beast that Hamas became on October 7. The tolerance that the international community has had for Deif and which Israel, in a sense, had by not removing him years ago will always haunt us as the Deif problem.

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