L’Estat d’Israel està sotmés des del seu naixement l’any 1948 a amenaces existencials que ha anat superant fins ara, enguany però n’hi ha de més complicades encara: la intifada diplomàtica internacional, com ha advertit el ministre d’afers exteriors Yair Lapid: 2022 sera une année de campagnes anti-israéliennes à l’international. Pour le ministre des Affaires étrangères, la participation du pays à des événements internationaux pourrait être menacée par des efforts visant à dépeindre “un État d’apartheid”. Tribune Juive tradueix una entrevista a Daniel Pomerantz, PDG de HonestReporting, publicada inicialment a Israel Hyom on explica el cada vegada més agressiu tractament d’Israel als mitjans i les ong progressites occidentals: « Ce qu’on voit se produire à La Haye et dans les ONG internationales est effrayant, parce que cela correspond vraiment à une mission contre Israël ».
Significativament, a la darreria de desembre, “L’ONU approuve le budget pour mener une enquête « à durée indéterminée » sur Israël. L’envoyé israélien a qualifié cette commission d’enquête de “méprisable et biaisée”. Elle se penchera sur le conflit de mai entre l’État hébreu et les groupes terroristes de Gaza.” I és d’esperar un cop del Tribunal Penal Internacional, com assenyala Caroline B. Glick en aqueix article a Israel Hayom fa quatre dies: The escalating international war against Israel.
No hi ha cap perspectiva raonable de negociació amb l’ANP malgrat els esforços de Benny Gantz, ja que els palestins esperen recollir els fruits de les pressions internacionals anteriorment descrites. Mentre que el perill de l’islamisme iranià és cada cop més agressiu i les FDI tenen limitacions diplomàtiques i operacionals per a fer-hi front com explica Judah Ari Gross, a The Times of Israel: “En 2022, Tsahal luttera pour chasser Téhéran de Syrie et contre les sites nucléaires“.
Post Scriptum, 10 de gener del 2022.
Freddy Eytan, director del CAPE de Jerusalem, dedica l’editorial d’avui a analitzar les perspectives d’Israël pel 2022: “leadership face aux menaces et défis“.
L’année 2022 débute avec ses angoisses collectives et privées, ses réflexions et interrogations sur l’avenir individuel, familial et national. Les menaces proches et lointaines seront décisives pour l’Etat juif, le Moyen-Orient et la communauté internationale. La fragilité gouvernementale et les mystères de la pandémie plongent la population dans l’incertitude et le désarroi. Ils aggravent la méfiance à l’égard du pouvoir, ils accentuent la violence verbale dans les débats publics, à la télévision, sur les réseaux sociaux et surtout à la Knesset.
Ils approfondissent le fossé entre riches et pauvres, la déchirure entre la Gauche et la Droite, laïcs et religieux. Ce virage dangereux risque d’éroder la résilience de la nation et déraper vers une situation incontrôlable, chaotique. Depuis plusieurs années nous constatons une absence de leadership dans les pays démocratiques y compris en Israël. Le trouble, la confusion, le populisme, et l’indifférence à l’égard des compatriotes gagnent toujours dans un monde en turbulence permanente.
Pour atteindre ses objectifs un véritable leader devrait avoir une vision claire, la capacité de guider, d’influencer et de motiver, inspirer confiance et surtout donner l’exemple. Une nation sans leadership ne pourra jamais résister aux conséquences d’un fléau, d’une attaque militaire, d’une pandémie ou une catastrophe naturelle majeure, puis à rétablir rapidement sa capacité de fonctionner normalement et de relever les défis en cours. Triste aussi de constater que l’égoïsme individuel l’emporte sur les intérêts de l’État et de ses citoyens.
La société israélienne est bien différente de celle que nous avons connue au moment de la création de l’État juif. Malgré le conflit armé, les vagues d’immigration, les difficultés d’absorption, le manque de ressources et de moyens matériels, la pauvreté dans les foyers, nous avons réussi à surmonter grâce à la solidarité et la fraternité. Le peuple israélien est unique, riche de sa jeunesse, de sa diversité et de son histoire millénaire. Il est toujours capable de faire des miracles. Il est vivace et généreux mais aussi meurtri, complexé et bourré de contradictions.
Israël est le seul pays au monde à ne pas avoir de frontières définitives ni de capitale légitimement reconnue. Le seul État à n’avoir jamais connu un jour de paix véritable depuis sa création. Le seul au monde où aucun citoyen ne peut circuler paisiblement sans ressentir la crainte d’un attentat. Le seul où le spectre du terrorisme frappe chaque matin. Le seul où la majorité écrasante de son peuple vit toujours à l’étranger. L’un des rares pays démocratiques où les pensées et les opinions des généraux prévalent souvent sur les décisions politiques, et où la force de l’esprit et la créativité spirituelle sont sommeillantes.
Il est temps de changer de cap.
A l’aube de l’année 2022 le gouvernement Bennet-Lapid devra mener une politique claire et cohérente et redonner confiance à tous ses citoyens, Juifs, Chrétiens et Arabes. Si ce gouvernement souhaite poursuivre son mandat jusqu’au bout il devra accomplir plusieurs missions et atteindre plusieurs objectifs :
En priorité éviter la confusion et la panique, combattre la pandémie avec sang-froid et sagesse. Apaiser les esprits par des messages clairs et non populistes. Offrir une assurance complète sur le plan sanitaire et un sentiment sincère de sécurité dans tous les domaines. Mettre un terme à la cacophonie. Chaque ministre devra s’occuper des affaires qu’il le concerne. Nommer un porte-parole crédible et parler d’une seule voix forte et limpide.
-Planifier enfin une stratégie sécuritaire pour l’avenir de l’Etat d’Israël. Considérer en priorité les frontières défendables face à une démographie galopante et aux menaces intérieures et extérieures.
-Devant la signature d’un nouvel accord avec l’Iran sur le projet nucléaire, intensifier la coordination diplomatique et sécuritaire avec les Etats-Unis, mais parallèlement se préparer à toutes les options, notamment à une attaque militaire. Est-elle envisageable ? Avons-nous les capacités et les moyens ? Comment éviter une confrontation avec les Etats-Unis ? Faut-il poursuive les actions du Mossad ? Comment réagir à une provocation du Hezbollah ? Une troisième guerre contre le Liban est-elle possible sera-t-elle prochainement à là l’ordre du jour ?
-Le problème palestinien devra être résolu selon une politique claire acceptée par tous les membres du gouvernement. Le Premier ministre ne peut accepter les démarches de Benny Gantz en s’opposant publiquement à toute solution politique.
-Le gouvernement devra réagir aux provocations systématiques du Hamas et nous dire quelle serait la bonne politique à long terme dans la bande de Gaza. Une nouvelle campagne militaire était-elle inévitable ? Quelles seront les conséquences sur l’Autorité palestinienne et les Arabes israéliens, surtout quand un parti islamiste est membre de la coalition.
– Consolider et étendre sans relâche les Accords d’Abraham avec d’autres pays arabo-musulmans.
– Lutter par tous les moyens contre le crime organisé au sein de la population arabe. Démanteler les réseaux de trafic d’armes et mettre un terme au banditisme.
– Relancer le dialogue avec les communautés juives en Europe et en Amérique. Leur soutien est indispensable. L’union fraternelle renforce notre résilience nationale. Durant la pandémie comment accepter une « discrimination » entre Juif et Israélien de la même famille ?
Les missions et les défis du gouvernement israélien sont sans doute les plus difficiles au monde, les plus complexes et très ingrates à accomplir. Les problèmes à résoudre sont compliqués et uniques, surtout existentielles. Le rôle de l’opposition est clair, le but est de faire tomber le gouvernement le plus tôt possible. Cependant, au moment où le pays traverse de nombreuses crises, le temps n’est pas propice pour aggraver encore plus la situation. Certes, combattre les défaillances et agir en transparence, mais ne jamais tomber dans la vulgarité et la bassesse, respecter autrui, privilégier avant tout les intérêts de l’Etat et de toute la population, sans aucune distinction.
Enfin, et malgré toutes les difficultés et les menaces prévues en 2022, nous pouvons compter sur notre foi dans notre juste cause, sur notre puissance militaire, scientifique et technologique, ainsi que sur la solidarité inébranlable des communautés juives. Ne perdons jamais l’espoir en des jours meilleurs et demeurons toujours vigilants.
Post Scriptum, 27 de gener del 2022.
Fa quatre dies el think-tank israelà INSS va presentar al president Herzog l’anàlisi anual sobre el principals reptes estratègics d’Israel: What follows are the highlights of the document. At the outset of 2022, the State of Israel lacks an integrated, consistent, and long-term strategic approach with respect to the challenges it faces.
At the outset of 2022, Israel’s strategic situation is marked by Israel’s failure to maximize its security, economic, and technological potential in its response to the political, security, and internal challenges it faces. This is due to the lack of an integrated, consistent, and long-term strategic approach.
At the center of the challenges is Iran, which continues to strive for a nuclear threshold, and already has the capabilities required for a breakout to a nuclear weapon within a space of weeks. At the same time, it remains determined to build up its military options to threaten Israel in several areas along its borders, including through the use of proxies in a counterattack and with missiles, rockets, unmanned aerial attack vehicles, and precision fire.
The Palestinian arena is a very serious challenge to the vision of Israel as a Jewish, democratic, secure, and moral state – particularly due to the drift toward a one-state reality. This poses concrete risks to Israel in the form of security escalation, in part because of the increasing weakness of the Palestinian Authority, to the point of a near inability to function and a lack of governance. In tandem, the situation in this arena challenges Israel’s international political and legal standing.
Within Israel there is an intensification of trends of polarization between different groups, incitement, and weak governance, particularly in uncontrolled enclaves, which compound the erosion of trust in state institutions. All these constitute a substantive threat to social resilience and national security.
At the global level, Israel must prepare for a range of extreme events due to climate change, frequent economic crises, changes in norms in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, and increasing concerns over the resilience of liberal democracies. Israel’s dependence on United States support continues, but the aid that Washington can give Israel is challenged by internal US polarization, even as America’s focus of attention is directed at its internal problems and the struggle with China, at the expense of its engagement with the Middle East. Against this background, the US administration is less prepared to pay attention to the interests and concerns of Israel, whether regarding Iran or in the Palestinian context. In addition, the United States is less willing to invest in extending and intensifying the normalization agreements between Israel and the pragmatic Arab countries.
President Isaac Herzog, referring to the Strategic Survey, said: The Three Main Threats Facing Israel in 2022.
Iranian nuclear activity: Tehran represents the most serious external threat to Israel, first and foremost due to Iran’s quest to achieve military nuclear capability. In the background is Israel’s structural inability to handle on its own all the challenges posed by Iran’s conduct, as well as the growing need to increase coordination with the United States and tighten the special relationship with it – whether or not agreement is reached between Iran and the great powers on its nuclear program. Moreover, Iran continues with its program of regional subversion, including its efforts to surround Israel with the threat of attack, especially through its precision missile project for Hezbollah in Lebanon and its proxies in Syria. Apart from thousands of missiles and rockets, Iran is equipping its proxies with thousands of unmanned aerial attack vehicles (UAVs), with a range that enables them to penetrate deep into Israel’s skies from all fronts.
The progress of its nuclear program has given Iran the shortest time ever to break out to nuclear weapons – if the regime in Tehran decides to do so. For Iran, this progress reinforces the temptation not to return to the nuclear agreement without considerable rewards, and the US administration might have neither the ability nor the desire to grant them. Also, Iran’s confidence and readiness to attack its enemies through its proxies has increased.
Israel for its part is at a strategic impasse regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. The various possible scenarios for the dialogue between Iran and the great powers, whether resulting in a partial agreement or lengthy foot-dragging, or even breakdown of talks, are all negative for Israel. However, the opposition to an arrangement between the powers and Iran, focused on a freeze of the nuclear program, will leave Israel isolated with only the military option for preventing Iran from attaining a nuclear weapon.
The Palestinian arena is not a secondary arena that can be contained by empty delusions about “limiting the conflict.” This fact became clear last year during Operation Guardian of the Walls, the round of fighting between Israel and Hamas. The absence of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict poses a serious threat to Israel’s identity as a Jewish and democratic state, and to its status on the international stage. The security situation in the West Bank is nearing a boiling point due to the weakness of the Palestinian Authority in the face of united opposition from various factions and street gangs. True, the situation is still under control, thanks to determined activity by the IDF and the Israel Security Agency, and through security cooperation with the mechanisms of the PA. However, the PA has been weakened and could cease to function, while the growing frustration of the younger generation of Palestinians drives them to think in terms of a one-state reality. Internationally, there is growing criticism of Israel, which in fact works to thwart the chances of implementing the “two states for two peoples” solution, and intensifies the danger of legal moves against Israel and its definition as an apartheid state. Regarding the Gaza Strip, Israel currently faces the same complex and long-lasting dilemma: the need for an urgent response to the humanitarian situation, while avoiding security escalation; pressing for the return of prisoners and missing persons held by Hamas; and preventing Hamas from achieving further military and political control.
Israel’s domestic arena: There are signs of a serious social problem emerging due to polarization, rifts, tensions, and extremism (whether ideological, verbal, or physical), in addition to the erosion of trust in government institutions. Meanwhile, there are gaps in readiness for multi-front and high casualty war scenarios, or for violent incidents involving Jews and Arabs. This arena is particularly challenging because of the weakness of the police and the development of uncontrolled enclaves, and above all the absence of national mechanisms for integrated handling of all the issues involved. The consequences of these weaknesses are affecting the responses to other national security challenges.
This convergence of challenges demands a change in the national order of priorities, focusing on restoring government control within the country and healing the rifts between different groups in society. In view of the external threats, Israel must improve the readiness of its military strength, while also cultivating and exploiting soft power assets – its achievements in the fields of technology, science, sea water desalination, and energy, particularly in view of the changes in the global agenda, with the increased emphasis on the need to combat climate change, and the health, social, and economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Israel’s relative advantages and its value to regional and international systems is particularly evident in contrast to the weaker countries of the Middle East. Against the background of these challenges, the INSS researchers presented ten policy recommendations, as follows:
Prepare an up-to-date, innovative, and comprehensive strategy, suitable for a changing strategic and operational environment, based on preparing simultaneously for the challenges arising in Iran, the Palestinian arena, and the domestic front.
Set up mechanisms for integrated government planning and action to restore law and order and governance in Israel’s uncontrolled enclaves; tackle crime in Arab society; reduce tension, hostility, and inequality between communities in Israel.
The Iranian challenge: prepare for a nuclear agreement between Iran and the powers, as well as for the absence of any agreement. There is a need to build a credible military option to stop Iran from achieving a nuclear weapon, preferably in coordination with the United States.
Continue and update the campaign between wars in the face of Iranian entrenchment and the establishment of its proxy militias along Israel’s borders. At the same time, tackle all the elements of the regional Iranian challenge, with the emphasis on stopping the precision missile project in Lebanon and thwarting Iran’s efforts to exert influence.
The Palestinian arena: promote political and economic-infrastructure moves to strengthen the Palestinian Authority and improve the fabric of civilian life; avoid steps that could hasten the slide into a one-state situation, and create the conditions for separation and future promotion of other options.
The Gaza Strip: continue the efforts to formulate moves in the spirit of “economy in exchange for security,” involving Egypt, international and regional elements, and the Palestinian Authority. Calm depends on a resolution of the prisoners and missing soldiers issue, and some relief of the restrictions on the Strip.
Heighten coordination with the United States, along with the special relationship and establishment of trust at the bipartisan level, stressing Israel’s value to the United States as a responsible actor, and as an asset in the fields of technology, science, enterprise, and culture.
Extend the Abraham Accords as well as ties with Jordan and Egypt – aiming for regional collaborations in a range of fields, including intelligence, air defenses, energy, agriculture, water, and healthcare. In addition, Israel must extend its economic contacts with countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, and ease tensions with Turkey.
The technological revolution and cyberspace accelerate the “learning competition,” which means that Israel must invest in developing science, technology, and technological studies in order to maintain and expand its relative advantage, which is an asset to its national security and global status.
Continue military buildup along the lines of the IDF multi-year “Tnufa” (Momentum) program to maintain Israel’s operational and technological superiority in the age of information, autonomous systems, and cyber; adapting operational plans and improving civil readiness for limited conflicts as well as a multi-front war.
Post Scriptum, 12 d’abril del 2022.
Kobi Michael i Udi Dekel, analistes de l’INSS van publicar-hi ahir el report No.1585: A Multi-Front Terror Campaign: How Should Israel Respond?
According to the systemic interpretation, the recent attacks are a terror campaign in an arena that encompasses several fronts that influence and are influenced by one another:
1.-The Gaza Strip – under the complete control of Hamas, in close coordination with Islamic Jihad
2.-Jerusalem – Hamas has limited influence in the area due to the many actors and limited access. Consequently, it exploits events and incidents to foment terrorism and violence and focuses on incitement campaigns.
3.-The West Bank is used by Hamas for activity against settlers, the IDF, and the Palestinian Authority. Its efforts focus on building terrorist infrastructure, developing and operating channels for smuggling weapons and money, especially from Jordan, and inciting terrorism among individuals and other terrorist organizations.
4.-The Negev – joining with the population of Bedouin citizens of Israel to disrupt processes of the return of Israeli governance to the area and in order to create a territorial contiguity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
5.-The internal Israel front – mainly: incitement of terrorist activity within radical groups among Arab citizens of Israel who have an Islamic fundamentalist views, such as former ISIS volunteers; monetary support; and encouragement of terrorist attacks in the heart of Israeli cities.
6.-Southern Lebanon – a front operated in coordination with Hezbollah and Iran, by Hamas recruits and other organizations in Lebanon. It serves as a smuggling route for weapons and terrorist funds into Israeli territory as well as a front for launching rockets into Israel.
Conclusion and Recommendations
If Israel is indeed facing a multi-front campaign led by Hamas, it should adopt a strategy that aims to undermine the logic that unifies the fronts and deny the organization control over the boundaries of the campaign. However, despite the desire to separate the fronts, Israel cannot cooperate with Hamas’s dual strategy, which maintains calm in Gaza and tries to ignite the other fronts. Therefore, it should consider directing efforts against Hamas, not necessarily military, as follows: (1) stop the transfer of money from Qatar to Hamas, unless Doha restrains the incitement and the involvement of Hamas in fronts outside of the Gaza Strip and stops using al-Jazeera to fan the flames; (2) enlist Egypt in placing pressure to restrain Hamas by stopping the reconstruction of Gaza and closing the crossings into Sinai; (3) rethink the policy of increasing the number of work permits in Israel for workers from Gaza, especially after Hamas’s takeover of the Ministry of Civilian Affairs in Gaza, such that it determines the eligibility for permits.
Jerusalem is the most volatile front, and it has the potential to unify the others. Consequently, it is necessary to invest intensive efforts in calming the tension in the city during Ramadan and enabling Muslim worshippers to enter al-Aqsa, while preventing tension between them and Jews entering the Temple Mount (separating the times and dealing immediately with mutual provocations). Simultaneously, it is important to enlist Jordan, with the United States’ support, in calming the situation in the Temple Mount complex. The understandings reached regarding expanding the number of guards in the Waqf system should be implemented, in return for Jordan ensuring the prevention of intervention by Hamas operatives and the northern branch of the Islamic Movement in the Waqf’s activity.
Israel is challenged by the Palestinian Authority’s negative contribution to the incitement and inflammation by its senior officials, and its antagonistic policy toward Israel on every international stage. However, Israel should be careful not to push the Palestinian Authority into the hands of Hamas, ensure that the fabric of life in the territories of the Palestinian Authority is maintained in order to distance the population from terrorism and violence, strengthen the coordination with the PA’s security apparatuses, enable them to impose law and order and deal with Hamas’s infrastructure, and even increase the effort to rebuild the Palestinian economy in the West Bank.
Islamic Jihad has grown significantly and gained strength in the northern West Bank and the Gaza Strip thanks to Iranian support. Its increased strength makes it a greenhouse of increasing amounts of terrorism, a source of attraction for activists who belonged to other organizations, and a worsening threat to the stability of the Palestinian Authority. Consequently, Israel should expose the Iranian contribution to the current deterioration of the security situation in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, whether it is a passing wave of terrorism or a systemic, long-term escalation.
Post Scriptum, 31 d’octubre del 2022.
El proppassat 18, Freddy Eytan es preguntava des del CAPE: Qui choisir pour diriger l’Etat d’Israël ?, jo triaria Benny Gantz si pogués votar, perquè estic decebut de la deriva de Netanyahu cap als sionistes religiosos com a únics aliats. Comparteixo l’angoixa de DavidHorovitz, avui a The Times of Israel: “Avec Ben Gvir et Smotrich, Israël risque une dérive extrémiste catastrophique. Les deux leaders d’extrême-droite seront ministres si Netanyahu remporte les élections ; leur programme aura pour effet de saper les principes et les fondations de l’État d’Israël.”
Post Scriptum, 1 de gener del 2023.
Malgrat l’hostilitat i els riscos, la força del poble jueu rau en la confiança en si mateix: “Les Israéliens toujours parmi les peuples les plus heureux au monde, et ils voient le nouveau gouvernement avec optimisme“, segons el digital Israel 24/7.
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