Les Forces de Defensa d’Israel han denominat Operació Fletxes del Nord l’ofensiva contra Hesbol·là en resposta al llençament de míssils des del Líban a partir del proppassat 8 d’octubre en suport a la massacre perpetrada per Hamàs el dia anterior. Després d’haver contingut el gihadisme a Gaza mitjançant l’Operació Espases de Ferro, sense haver assolit la completa desfeta política i militar dels gihadistes palestins, la nova operació té com a objectiu forçar la retirada d’Hesbol·là més enllà del riu Litani i el seu desarmament tal com va acordar la Resolució 1.701 del Consell de Seguretat de l’ONU que va aturar la guerra del 2006.
Les Nacions Unides han desplegat inútilment la FINUL a la frontera israeliano-libanesa i ara bramen contra Israel per defensar-se i fer-la complir. Fa caure la cara de vergonya escoltar aqueixos dies els representants dels estats àrab-musulmans, França, Espanya i tots els totalitarismes que convergeixen en el palestinisme culpabilitzar Israel i exculpar Iran i els seus sicaris palestins. També Joe Biden fa pena veure’l demanar un alto-el-foc sense solució real al conflicte i impedint que Israel derroti els enemics que el volen exterminar, aqueixa política d’apaivagament sense dissuasió és la que permet a Iran assolir la bomba atòmica.
Israel lluita en solitari en aqueixa guerra existencial per la seva pròpia supervivència i la d’Occident, malgrat que la majoria d’estats occidentals li girin l’esquena, tal com resumeix Ives Mamou avui a Tribune Juive, aqueix és l’estat actual del conflicte:
Cela fait onze mois que le Hezbollah canonne le nord d’Israël en signe de solidarité avec le Hamas. Depuis onze mois, les Etats-Unis multiplient les voyages à Beyrouth dans l’espoir d’obtenir par la voie diplomatique un cesser le feu du Hezbollah. En vain. Apres onze mois d’attente, Israël a fait comprendre aux Etats-Unis que le temps de la négociation était révolu. L’épreuve de force avec le Hezbollah a commencé. L’issue de la guerre ne fait pas de doutes. L’affaire des bipeurs et des talkies montre qu’Israël s’est préparé de longue date à une confrontation et s’est donné les moyens de la gagner.
Du coup, on réalise que toute la stratégie du Hamas et aussi du Hezbollah reposait sur l’idée que les puissants alliés d’Israël allaient lui ligoter les mains.
1) Yahia Sinwar n’aurait jamais placé les Gazaouis en position de bouclier humain s’il n’avait pas eu la certitude que le monde occidental tout entier allait se dresser contre Israël, accusant les juifs de “génocide”. Tout plutôt que faire une égratignure au “peuple palestinien”. La pression mondiale a eu lieu, mais Israël n’a pas cédé.
2) L’Iran et le Hezbollah étaient persuadés que Washington ferait tout pour empêcher une guerre élargie à la veille des élections présidentielles américaines. Ils croyaient dur comme fer que Washington allait faire plier Israël et obtenir un cesser le feu à Gaza, ce qui leur aurait donné le beau rôle d’arrêter le bombardement quotidien du nord d’Israël.
3) Le Hamas et le Hezbollah fondaient aussi beaucoup d’espoir sur la gauche israélienne qui, sans aucun souci de l’intérêt national, cherchait à renverser Netanyahou, casser la coalition par tous les moyens possible et obtenir de nouvelles élections.
Le gouvernement n’a pas cédé, la coalition a tenu et le Hamas et le Hezbollah comprennent maintenant qu’ils sont dans la nasse. Soit ils encaissent une défaite, soit EUX réclament des négociations. Il reste aussi la possibilité que l’Iran, les Houthis, les milices pro-iraniennes en Syrie et en Irak entrent dans la danse. Histoire de montrer que le Hezbollah n’est pas tout seul. Mais là, c’est une autre histoire…
Post Scriptum, 25 de setembre del 2024.
Per la seva part, l’analista militar Avigdor Haselkorn alertava ahir a Yediot Ahronoth que malgrat els cops incials contra Hesbol·là les FDI tenen oberts tots els fronts amb l’eix iranià: “Israel’s existential fronts“. Avui mateix han estat llençats míssils des d’Iraq, un dels estats -amb Jordània i Egipte, teòrics amics d’Israel- que ahir proclamava des del teatre de l’absurd en que s’ha convertit l’ONU, que Israel és l’únic culpable del conflicte en curs.
Post Scriptum, 26 de setembre del 2024.
La proposta de treva promoguda per França i els EUA, sense resoldre les causes del conflicte, només serveixen per aturar la victòria d’Israel i, com explica avui el Jerusalem Post: “Ceasefire ensures next Oct. 7′: Israeli politicians, municipal leaders slam US-French proposal. Residents and politicians in northern Israel oppose the US-French ceasefire proposal with Hezbollah, fearing it may lead to future violence”. Le Figaro publica aqueixa clarificadora entrevista que hauria de fer caure la cara de vergonya als “analistes” nostrats: «Face au Hezbollah, Israël mène la même guerre existentielle que contre le Hamas». Pour le rédacteur en chef de la revue Conflits, Jean-Baptiste Noé, les frappes d’Israël au Liban peuvent se lire comme la deuxième phase de l’opération menée à la suite de l’attaque du 7 octobre. Avec, explique-t-il, un même objectif: éradiquer ceux qui veulent en finir avec Israël.
Post Scriptum, 28 de setembre del 2024.
Avui, a The Times of Israel, David Horovitz analitza la fase actual del conflicte entre Israel i l’eix iranià: “Killing of Nasrallah shows the IDF reasserting primacy, gradually restoring public trust. A year ago, Israeli complacency enabled Hamas’s horrific slaughter. Now Israel is fighting back, Hezbollah is paying the price of overconfidence, and Iran is on the back foot”.
Post Scriptum, 30 de setembre del 2024.
Els mitjans occidentals majoritàriament rosseguen claus arran de l’ofensiva de les FDI contra l’eix iranià (Le Monde, els diplomàtics podrits com Villepin, Borrell i tants d’altres) demanant un alto-el-foc immediat per protegir els gihadistes. En aqueix breu però punyent article de Ben-Dror Yemini|ahir al Yediot Ahronot resumeix l’hipocresia occidental: “Hey West, don’t interfere – Israel is working. Hamas and Hezbollah are armed with Qatari money, Iranian weapons and Western support”.
Post Scriptum, 13 d’octubre del 2024.
Les FINUL s’exclamen que les FDI els demanin retirar-se del front de guerra i deixin d’encobrir les infraestructures bastides per Hisbol·là davant dels seus nassos des del 2006 ençà incomplint impunement la Resolució 1.701 del Consell de Seguretat de l’ONU. Netanyahu li ha ha demanat directament a Antonio Guterres, però els mitjans nostrats s’estimen més divulgar informacions sense contrastar-les per tal d’acusar Israel.
Post Scriptum, 14 d’octubre del 2024.
Ofer Shelah signen aqueix report avui a l’INSS d’Israel: “The IDF Ground Operation in Lebanon — Goals, Alternatives and Consequences“.
Post Scriptum, 17 d’octubre del 2024.
Editorial del Jerusalem Post ahir: “UNIFIL’s inaction and the West’s blind eye. Hezbollah has been hiding behind UNIFIL for far too long, but European leaders continue to blame Jerusalem.
Post Scriptum, 3 de desembre del 2024.
Brian Carter analitza ahir per l’ISW “Israel’s Victory in Lebanon“.
Israeli operations in Lebanon have defeated Hezbollah and compelled the group to end its involvement in the October 7 War. On November 26, Israel and Hezbollah reached a ceasefire deal that ended Hezbollah’s attacks into Israel and required the group to disarm in southern Lebanon.[1] These conditions achieve the stated Israeli war aim of safely returning displaced citizens to their homes in northern Israel. The ceasefire ensures the Israeli right to self-defense against any future threat that Hezbollah may pose as well.[2] Hezbollah, on the other hand, is severely degraded and has failed to achieve its stated war aim of compelling Israel to accept a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[3] Israel’s victory and Hezbollah’s defeat have drastically changed the security landscape in the Middle East by limiting Hezbollah’s ability to deter Israel. Though Israel has won this round of conflict in Lebanon, Hezbollah will almost certainly begin reconstituting its forces and likely try re-entrenching itself in southern Lebanon at some point. The United States and Israel must ensure that Hezbollah adheres to the ceasefire. If Hezbollah violates the ceasefire, the United States must permit Israel to use force to disrupt Hezbollah’s efforts to rebuild its forces and the threat that it poses to Israel.
Hezbollah entered the war on October 8, 2023—one day after Hamas’ ground attack into Israel. Hezbollah began firing almost daily drone, missile, and rocket attacks targeting towns and military sites in northern Israel.[5] These attacks led thousands of Israeli citizens to evacuate, leaving many of them displaced for over a year.[6] The stated Hezbollah objectives were to fix some Israeli forces along the border and compel Israel to accept a ceasefire with Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[7] Israel tried to attrit Hezbollah forces along the border in response by conducting intermittent shelling and airstrikes into Lebanon targeting Hezbollah leaders and logistics.
Israel eventually decided to conduct major operations into Lebanon in summer 2024 to make Hezbollah unwilling to continue attacks. Israel began this campaign by conducting airstrikes targeting key leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, and detonating thousands of pagers and hand-held radios belonging to Hezbollah members across Lebanon.[8] These efforts disrupted Hezbollah forces and paralyzed the group temporarily. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) exploited this disruption by launching ground operations against disorganized Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon.[9] The IDF cleared the surrounding border towns in Lebanon and seized key terrain, such as ridgelines from which Hezbollah would fire into northern Israel.
These Israeli operations made serious progress toward securing citizens in northern Israel by addressing the most immediate threats that Hezbollah posed. The IDF ground operations disrupted the ability of Hezbollah to fire coordinated, large-scale rocket barrages into northern Israel.[10] The IDF also destroyed key offensive capabilities that Hezbollah had in southern Lebanon, such as tunnels meant to support ground attacks into northern Israel.[11] Hezbollah had long planned for its powerful offensive military unit, the Radwan Force, to use these tunnels to conduct attacks into Israel that would be similar to what Hamas did on October 7, 2023.[12] These ground attacks are part of a concept developed by Iran and its Axis of Resistance to use ground warfare and information operations to destabilize Israel and ultimately erode the viability of an Israeli state.[13]
The IDF designed its campaign to facilitate a political settlement rather than to destroy Hezbollah entirely. Israeli political leadership ordered the IDF to create conditions that would return citizens to northern Israel, which did not imply destroying Hezbollah as a military organization. The Israeli campaign—in line with the orders from Israeli political leadership—severely degraded Hezbollah, destroyed key capabilities in southern Lebanon, and destroyed the willingness of its leaders to continue fighting. That led Hezbollah to accept the ceasefire deal on November 26, despite having failed to achieve its stated objective of forcing an end to fighting in the Gaza Strip. But destroying all of Hezbollah’s ability to attack Israel would have been tantamount to destroying Hezbollah as a military organization, which would require a much greater military effort than what Israeli political leadership ordered the IDF to do. Destroying Hezbollah would have presumably required the IDF to capture Beirut to destroy Hezbollah military and political leadership and destroy the long-range strike capabilities that Hezbollah has deeper in Lebanon. Such an operation would risk destabilizing Lebanon and entail a years-long military commitment.
Although Hezbollah can still break the ceasefire and fire into Israel at any time, the strategic threat that it poses to Israel is far diminished. The large Hezbollah rocket and drone barrages in the days before the ceasefire will inevitably draw comparisons between this ground campaign and the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, in which Hezbollah fired hundreds of rockets just before Israel agreed to the ceasefire.[14] Hezbollah sought to prove in 2006 that it had won the war and likely aimed to do so again in 2024 by firing rockets at much higher rates leading up to the ceasefire deal.[15] The IDF inflicted far greater damage to Hezbollah in this campaign than it did in 2006, however. The IDF has killed nearly all of the top Hezbollah commanders, degraded the Radwan Force, destroyed kilometers of offensive tunnels, and demonstrated the Israeli ability to rapidly inflict massive casualties upon Hezbollah at relatively little cost.[16]
Israel’s victory in Lebanon and its defeat of Hamas drastically improved Israel’s security situation by removing the immediate threats posed by Iranian-backed groups around the Israeli periphery. Israel is thus redefining the security landscape of the Middle East in fundamental ways—at least temporarily.
Hezbollah will almost certainly try to reconstitute its forces and very likely with Iranian support, however. Hezbollah therefore still poses a strategic threat to Israel, despite being defeated in this round of conflict. The United States and Israel must ensure that Hezbollah continues to adhere to the ceasefire and does not rearm in southern Lebanon. The United States and Israel will also need to hold the guarantors of the ceasefire accountable. The ceasefire relies on UNIFIL and the Lebanese state to implement many of its provisions, including preventing Hezbollah from rearming. But UNIFIL and the Lebanese state proved unable and unwilling to fulfill this same responsibility after UN Security Council Resolution 1701 ended the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006, raising questions about whether they could enforce the latest ceasefire. Washington must therefore continue to support the Israeli right to use force against Hezbollah efforts to rearm and re-entrench in southern Lebanon. Failing to prevent Hezbollah from rearming will increase the risk of a new war in the years ahead dramatically. And there is no guarantee that a future Israel-Hezbollah war will be as contained and short as this one was.
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