Jaume Renyer

That assumption has been reinforced by recent developments in Venezuela, where the United States forcibly removed Nicolás Maduro from power and now appears prepared to work with figures from within the same governing apparatus.

But Iran is not Venezuela, and treating it as such misunderstands the nature of the Islamic Republic’s power structure.

In Venezuela, despite corruption and the concentration of power, the political system is not security-ideological and transnational in the way Iran’s is. Loyalties and alliances in Caracas can shift without forcing a fundamental remake of the establishment.

Can the same be said about Tehran?

Over the past four decades, the original theocracy has evolved into a complex security-ideological power machine whose core lies within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its affiliated networks. This machine is not merely an instrument of the system; it has become inseparable from it.

The IRGC, the Quds Force, parallel intelligence bodies, and a web of armed groups across the region are better understood as a single, tightly interwoven power structure. Even the potential departure of Iran’s supreme leader would be unlikely to alter, let alone dismantle, this organism.

Ali Khamenei may embody the Islamic Republic, and his name is often used interchangeably with the “system,” but the state itself encompasses thousands of actors across the Revolutionary Guards, security institutions and affiliated bodies.

These networks have cooperated operationally with aligned forces in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan—working together in war, negotiation, and crisis management.

Other parts of the same apparatus have spent years developing missile and nuclear programs, accumulating expertise, institutional memory, and vested interests.

This is the product of a shared political and security life: a layered network in which relationships, trust, and interests have solidified over time. Such a network does not collapse with the departure of a single figure, or even a single faction.

Security relationships and interests built over decades are far more likely to reproduce themselves than to disappear with a leadership change. The leader may go, but the system’s underlying logic will remain.

That logic rests on several widely entrenched pillars: the expansion of the nuclear program; the development of missile and drone capabilities; the preservation and extension of regional proxy networks; and the definition of political identity in opposition to the United States and the West.

These are not merely policy preferences open to negotiation. They are widely treated within the system as pillars of survival. Betting on figures drawn from within this structure to shed their skin risks reproducing the very logic such a strategy claims to transcend.

The image of a moderate caretaker or a deal-making leader emerging as a Bonaparte-like figure capable of transforming the system is therefore closer to political fantasy than practical possibility.

Comparing Iran to Venezuela is ultimately a comparison between two dissimilar systems.

In Venezuela, alliances can shift while the structure remains intact. In Iran, the structure itself is the source of the crisis. The container and its contents are one and the same. A change of skin does not resolve that contradiction.

For Iranians—and for the wider world—the problem with the Islamic Republic cannot be solved by changing faces. A durable solution can only be contemplated when this structure gives way to an order that is fundamentally different, shaped by actors who are fundamentally different as well.

I la segona, la de Raz Zimmt, analista de l’INSS d’Israel, avui al Ynet: “How close is Iran to a revolutionary breaking point? Iran’s protests test not only the regime’s ability to repress dissent, but the loyalty and resolve of its own supporters, raising questions about whether internal doubt, rather than street pressure alone, could shift the balance of power.

Post Scriptum, 14 de gener del 2026.

Ahir a Le Figaro Alain Destexhe:« L’Iran des ayatollahs : à l’origine de la déstabilisation islamiste mondiale ». L’Iran est devenu le premier État moderne à ériger l’islamisme en instrument d’exportation idéologique. Depuis 1979, la menace islamiste s’est ainsi étendue à l’échelle mondiale, faisant émerger le terrorisme international tel qu’il se manifeste aujourd’hui.

Post Scriptum, 16 de gener del 2026.

De tot el que he pogut llegir l’anàlisi més encertada sobre l’aturada sobtada de l’atac dels EUA a l’Iran és aqueixa de Ron Ben-Yishai ahir a Ynet:  “Iran attack postponed but not canceled: The reasons, and the brutal repression that achieved its goal. Washington concluded that potential cost -harm to American bases, Israel, and energy industry in the Gulf- far outweigh any strategic gain and will return to diplomacy: Meanwhile, Iarnians are terrified of the brutal suppresion of the protest and have stopped.

I sobre el caràcter del règim i el tremp dels opositors aqueix escrit (arribat des de dins mateix de l’Iran d’un resistent anònim publicat per Persuasion el proppassat 7) em sembla el més ajustat a la realitat: “Here’s Why the Iranian Regime Seems Invincible. And why it shouldn’t stop the citizens currently fighting for freedom.”

Over the past few decades, Iranians’ protests against the Islamic Republic have become a regular sight—bursts of defiance that light up the streets, fill the air with hope, and then fade away only to become a fire beneath ashes. Each protest seems bigger, braver, and more hopeful. Yet each time, the system endures.

Still, hope doesn’t die. You can hear it in every conversation and encrypted message coming out of Iran: people still believe change is possible.

Recent protests—ongoing since December 28—were sparked by a long-brewing economic crisis, particularly the collapsing Iranian rial and soaring inflation. They began with shopkeepers protesting in Tehran, but have since spread to a majority of provinces. Unlike earlier protest movements that were often confined to the middle class, the current round cuts across class divisions, involving people from diverse economic and ethnic backgrounds.

Yet the way the government responded has remained the same. So far, over 30 protesters are reported to have been killed, and thousands more have been arrested. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has said that “rioters should be put in their place,” and has vowed not to “yield to the enemy.”

I’ve heard that sentence repeated for more than two decades. And, despite the recent images rocking the country, the question remains: Why do the next six months never arrive?

It’s not that Iranians lack the will, courage, or desire for change. People have protested, sacrificed, and died. Yet no uprising has delivered lasting structural change.

Some Iranians I have spoken to inside the country hope for outside intervention. “We need help, and we’ll take it from anyone,” several have told me. For people who face the oppression machine daily, it feels impossible to change the system from within. A regime born of revolution was built to survive any revolt.

Trump’s recent threats—“If Iran shoots and violently kills peaceful protesters … the United States of America will come to their rescue”—along with the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by U.S. forces, have reignited hope among many desperate Iranians who are willing to endure anything if it means the end of the Islamic Republic.

But the Islamic Republic is exceptionally difficult to bring down for three main reasons: Its complicated structure of power, the leaderless nature of resistance, and the outside world’s quiet interest in maintaining the status quo.

Unlike most countries, Iran operates as a web of power with, effectively, two governments stacked on top of one another: the elected layer that handles daily administration, and the unelected layer that holds real power. At the top sits Khamenei, who controls the military, intelligence, judiciary, and media, and can block any government decision. The Supreme Leader is chosen by the Assembly of Experts—88 clerics whose candidates are pre-approved by the Guardian Council, which also vets all elections. Enforcing this system is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a parallel military answering directly to the Supreme Leader, which is in charge of businesses, intelligence operations, and protest suppression.

The Islamic Republic is not a pyramid of power; it’s a maze. Every corridor looks like an exit until it loops back to the same center. The design isn’t accidental; it’s survival architecture.

“Everyone in Iran works for the IRGC,” a young friend told me. “When I buy booze from the black market—do you know who sells it to me? The IRGC. To stay alive here, you have to feed the dragon.”

In this closed system, even if someone kidnapped the Supreme Leader, the system itself could very well remain intact.

Another reason the system survives is fear. Over the decades, the Islamic Republic has created a class of people who benefit from the regime, and another class who enforce it. They understand that if the system collapses, they will be the first to face arrest and trial—or worse, execution—while the more powerful figures escape abroad. That’s why the closer collapse is, the harder the regime lashes out—not because it feels confident, but because it feels cornered.