L’Institut per a l’Estudi de la Guerra (oficialment i en anglès Institute for the Study of War, ISW) és un think tank de recerca i reflexió sense ànim de lucre estatunidenc fundat el 2007 per la historiadora militar Kimberly Kagan i amb seu a Washington, que ofereix diàriament en obert anàlisis sobre els conflictes provocats per Iran, Rússia i Xina.
Generalment s’abstenen de fer valoracions polítiques explícites sobre les decisions dels governs implicats, per això trobo significatiu aqueix report d’ahir titulat Ukraine Fact Sheet, que és una revolcada al posicionament del president Donald Trump de fer costat a Putin en detriment de Zelenski:
Zelensky does not imminently risk losing all of Ukraine.
- Russian forces currently occupy around 20 percent of Ukraine, leaving the remaining 80 percent of the country under Ukraine’s sovereign control.
- At the current rate of advance, it would take Russian forces over 83 years to capture the remaining 80 percent of Ukraine, assuming that they can sustain massive personnel losses indefinitely.
- Russia’s rate of advance on the frontline has slowed significantly over the past three months.[1]
- Russian forces are making small territorial gains at the cost of massive personnel losses.[2]
- Russian forces advanced at an average rate of 27.94 square kilometers per day in November 2024, 18.1 square kilometers per day in December 2024, and 16.1 square kilometers per day in January 2025.[3]
Most Ukrainian cities have not been destroyed.
- Many of Ukraine’s largest cities, including Kyiv, Lviv, Dnipro, and Odesa, have avoided destruction and continue to function. Russia has leveled some Ukrainian cities as it has attacked and occupied them, such as Mariupol.[4] Cities throughout the 80 percent of Ukraine that Russian forces have not occupied have remained largely intact during Russia’s invasion, apart from deliberate Russian strikes against critical and civilian infrastructure.[5]
Ukrainian law prohibits holding elections in wartime (unlike the US Constitution, which requires it).
- Ukraine’s Constitution prevents the Ukrainian government from holding elections or amending the constitution in times of martial law.[6]
- Russia triggered Ukraine’s martial law provisions when it launched its illegal invasion of Ukraine.
- The Ukrainian government cannot constitutionally suspend martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.
- Ukrainian opposition politicians, including those who have historically run against Zelensky, have stated that holding elections under martial law would be both illegal and immoral.[7]
Ukraine has not suffered millions of losses.
- Ukraine has not suffered “millions” of losses by any reliable estimate, either in terms of civilian or military casualties.
- Zelensky stated on February 16, 2025, that Russia has killed 46,000 Ukrainian soldiers since the start of the full-scale invasion, and that Ukraine has suffered over 390,000 soldiers wounded in action.[8]
- US officials have placed the number of Ukrainian military losses between 60,000 and 70,000, but no reputable source places casualty estimates near or in the millions.[9]
- The UN confirmed that Russia had killed over 12,000 Ukrainian civilians as of the end of 2024.[10]
Europe provides about as much direct aid to Ukraine as the United States.
Europe (including European Union [EU] members and EU institutions plus Norway and the UK) has overtaken the United States in terms of cumulative direct (military and non-military) aid allocations to Ukraine (not counting the costs of US forces forward-deployed in Eastern Europe).[11]
- Europe has provided Ukraine with a total of $166 billion in cumulative aid and pledged an additional $34.7 billion to be allocated through 2030.[12]
- Europe has provided and pledged approximately $204.1 billion in all — over $174 billion from the EU, $13.9 billion from Norway, and $16.2 billion from the UK — compared to America’s $183 billion.[13]
- These figures do not include the EU and G7 commitments to provide loans to Ukraine financed by income generated from frozen Russian assets.
European loans to Ukraine are backed by income from frozen Russian assets, not Ukraine.
The EU is contributing $20 billion in loans to Ukraine that are backed by extraordinary revenues from immobilized Russian sovereign assets, not Ukraine.[14]
- The EU holds approximately $220.5 billion in Russian frozen assets.[15]
- The EU has already made available $1.6 billion for Ukraine from immobilized Russian assets and disbursed $3.2 billion in loans in January 2025.
Ukraine did not misuse or lose half of the aid the United States has provided.
- The majority of the funds the United States has allocated for Ukraine stays in the United States to fund domestic defense industrial base and replenish US stockpiles.[16]
- US government agencies closely oversee the remaining US aid, which is directly issued to Ukraine. The US Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Inspector General reported on January 11, 2024, that it had found no evidence of misappropriated aid.[17]
Ukraine repeatedly invited Putin to negotiate in early 2022.
- Zelensky proposed to meet with Putin on February 19, 2022 — just five days before Russia launched its full-scale invasion.[18] Putin ignored this request and invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022.[19]
- Zelensky called for direct talks with Putin “in any format” in March 2022 and offered to compromise on Ukraine’s accession into NATO.[20] The Russians demanded the full surrender and demilitarization of Ukraine.[21]
- Zelensky also expressed openness to discussing the status of occupied Ukrainian territories on the condition that the Ukrainian people would ratify any deal through a referendum.[22] Putin rejected that offer as well.
Post Scriptum, 25 de febrer del 2025.
Ahir, l’ISW va pubicar aqueix report que complementa l’anterior posicionament: Russia Has Failed to Break Ukraine:
Russia dedicated staggering amounts of manpower and equipment to several major offensive efforts in Ukraine in 2024, intending to degrade Ukrainian defenses and seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. These Russian efforts included major operations in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast area, Avdiivka, Chasiv Yar, northern Kharkiv Oblast, Toretsk, Marinka-Kurakhove, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar-Velyka Novosilka. Russia has achieved relatively faster gains in 2024 than throughout most of the war after the initial invasion and developed a blueprint for conducting slow, tactical envelopments to achieve these advances, but Russian forces have failed to restore the operational maneuver necessary to achieve operationally significant gains rapidly. Russia has thus paid an exorbitant price in manpower and equipment losses that Russia cannot sustain in the medium term for very limited gains.
Russian losses in massive efforts that have failed to break Ukrainian lines or even drive them back very far are exacerbating challenges that Russia will face in sustaining the war effort through 2025 and 2026, as ISW’s Christina Harward has recently reported.[1] Russia likely cannot sustain continued efforts along these lines indefinitely without a major mobilization effort that Russian President Vladimir Putin has so far refused to order. Ukraine, on the other hand, has shown its ability to fight off massive and determined Russian offensive efforts even during periods of restricted Western aid. The effective failure of these major and costly Russian offensive operations highlights the opportunities Ukraine has to inflict more serious battlefield defeats on Russia that could compel Putin to rethink his approach to the war and to negotiations if the United States and the West continue to provide essential support.