La llarga lluita del poble kurd per sobreviure a l’opressió dels estats que l’esquarteren (Turquia, Síria, Iraq i Iran) ha conegut en aqueixa darrera setmana dues novetats rellevants de resultat incert: la crida del líder del PKK a l’autodissolució de l’organització i l’entesa entre les SDF i el nou govern sirià en vistes a l’acomodació de la comunitat kurda al nou estat.
Els termes i les conseqüències d’ambdós fets són, per ara, poc concrets, per això em remeto a la valoració que en fan analistes en geostratègia de prestigi:
Abans d’ahir, el report diari de l’ISW s’expressava així: “The Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) rejected the draft constitution that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara adopted on March 13.[7] The SDC is the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). The AANES similarly stated on March 13 that the constitution was too like the Bashar al Assad regime’s constitution and noted that the focus on Arab identity is a “de-facto falsification of Syria’s national and societal identity.”[8] The SDC claimed that the constitution “grants the executive authority absolute powers, while restricting political activity” and obstructs democratic transition.[9] CTP-ISW noted on March 13 that Shara could use some of the articles in the constitution to consolidate his power over the Syrian state.[10]
The SDC view of the constitution could impact the political and military integration efforts between AANES and Damascus that began on March 10, but it is unclear what exact effects it will have at this time.[11] The SDC condemned the constitution drafting process when National Dialogue Conference sessions were not held in AANES territory before committing to integration efforts.[12] Civilians in SDF-controlled Hasakah shared the SDC sentiment and demonstrated against the new constitution on March 14.[13]
Ahir, Gallia Lindenstrauss exposava el seu parer a l’INSS d’Israel: “Lay Down Your Arms! The Dramatic Call of the PKK Leader in Turkey”. What is behind Abdullah Öcalan’s historic call for an end to the organization’s armed campaign – and how will it affect the Kurdish minority and the entire region?
Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdish underground group PKK, made a dramatic call on February 27 for the organization’s militants to disarm and dissolve. This declaration marks a significant turning point in efforts to end the violent chapter of the Kurdish struggle against the Turkish government. While abandoning the PKK’s long-standing fight, which began with the organization’s founding in 1978, will entail considerable challenges, there is evident willingness to act in accordance with Öcalan’s statement, at least regarding the PKK’s operations within Turkey. Developments in Turkey have repercussions for the broader Kurdish population in neighboring states, weakening the ability of the Kurds in Syria to maintain their autonomous governance and enhancing Turkey’s influence in Syria, which may also increase the threat to Israel.
On February 27, representatives of Turkey’s pro-Kurdish party, the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), read a letter from Abdullah Öcalan, who has been in solitary confinement in Turkey since 1999. In the letter, he called on the PKK to cease its violent struggle and completely disband. Although there have been ceasefires in the past between Turkey and the PKK, Öcalan has never before called for the organization’s dissolution. A few weeks prior, rumors suggested that Öcalan might make such an announcement, but details remained unknown. The opacity surrounding the negotiations with him suggests a high degree of seriousness. The absence of significant leaks, which could have prompted a backlash, enabled the declaration, which may indeed have transformative implications.
Several factors have contributed to this announcement. One is the personal transformation Öcalan underwent in prison, shifting away from calls for Kurdish independence. In his statement, he asserted that the conditions that originally necessitated the PKK’s creation no longer exist. Militarily, since 2021, Turkey has intensified attacks on PKK militants taking refuge in northern Iraq, likely weakening the organization. In fact, much of the recent conflict between Turkey and the PKK has taken place outside of Turkey. Additionally, technological advancements, particularly in Turkey’s defense industry and its production of drones, have further complicated the PKK’s ability to counter Turkish military efforts. Turkish drone strikes have resulted in greater Kurdish casualties while minimizing Turkish losses. Consequently, Öcalan entered negotiations from a position of weakness.
From the Turkish government’s perspective, many analysts highlight President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s desire to amend the Turkish constitution as a key motivation in negotiating with Öcalan. Specifically, Erdoğan wishes to seek another presidential term in the 2028 elections; however, under the current constitution, he is limited to two terms. To run again, he would need to amend the constitution or call early elections to avoid completing a full second term as an executive president. Achieving constitutional changes requires broader parliamentary support, and Erdoğan appears to be courting Kurdish voters—even if only temporarily. His move also seems aimed at fragmenting Kurdish voting patterns and drawing more Kurdish votes toward his party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Already, some Kurds align with the AKP’s conservative agenda, a trend that may strengthen. Beyond electoral considerations, the Kurdish minority issue is a fundamental challenge for Turkey. The decades-long conflict with the PKK has claimed over 45,000 lives. Whoever succeeds in transforming relations with Turkey’s Kurdish minority, which comprises approximately one-fifth of the population, could propel the country forward, aligning with Erdoğan’s vision of a “New Turkey.”
For Ankara, developments in Syria since the fall of President Bashar al-Assad also play a central role in its willingness to negotiate with Öcalan. Turkey views the autonomous Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria as a security threat and an extension of the PKK’s operations within Turkey. In Turkey’s vision for Syria’s post-Assad future, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—which control northeast Syria and include Arab, Kurdish, and other minority groups—should be dismantled and integrated into the Syrian army as individual fighters. Given the dominance of the PKK’s Syrian branch within the SDF, Turkey hopes Öcalan’s call will encourage PKK-linked elements to withdraw from Syria.
Given the long-standing conflict and its toll, reconciliation must reach all segments of the population. However, Erdoğan’s authoritarian tendencies—including his harsh treatment of the opposition and efforts to delegitimize it—raise concerns. In particular, the continued arrests of elected Kurdish mayors in southeastern Turkey (where Kurds form a majority), on charges of PKK collaboration, cast doubt on Turkey’s readiness to support a genuine peace process. Amid Turkey’s democratic decline over the past decade, Öcalan’s assertion that only democracy can provide a solution rings hollow.
Unlike the previous decade’s Kurdish-Turkish dialogue, which ultimately failed, this time Erdoğan appears to be keeping his distance, possibly to disavow the process should it falter. The unexpected call in October 2024 for Öcalan to disarm—along with an invitation to address the Turkish parliament if he complied—came from Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli. Bahçeli’s support for this move was unpopular among his supporters, and his fragile health raises concerns about the process’s stability.
It remains unclear what the Kurdish side gained in exchange for Öcalan’s declaration. By asserting that the conditions necessitating the PKK’s creation no longer exist, he significantly weakened Kurdish demands for cultural rights. Even if Öcalan personally recognized the need to disband the PKK, Turkey’s fundamental challenge in dealing with its Kurdish minority persists. Above all, there is concern that granting cultural rights could translate into a political and security threat to Erdoğan’s continued rule. However, Öcalan is correct in noting that the conflict and its consequences have led to significant Kurdish migration to western Turkey, making territorial separation less feasible than before. Yet, this demographic mixing and the Kurds’ higher birth rates compared to the rest of Turkey could heighten perceptions of them as a threat unless genuine reconciliation occurs.
Regarding northeast Syria, while SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi welcomed Öcalan’s statement, acknowledging its potential positive regional impact, he emphasized that it applies only to the PKK and not to the SDF. Since Turkey considers these groups indistinguishable, Abdi’s remarks could fuel Turkish concerns. However, on March 10, Abdi and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa reached a groundbreaking agreement to integrate the SDF and elements of the autonomous administration in northeast Syria into Syrian government structures. If implemented, this agreement could significantly alleviate Ankara’s fears.
Recent shifts in Turkish-Kurdish relations underscore the dilemmas facing Israel regarding its policy towards developments in Syria. The fall of Assad and the Abdi-Sharaa agreement diminish the likelihood of continued Kurdish autonomy in Syria. Abdi publicly stated that the SDF is open to Israeli assistance, but given Turkey’s direct security interests in the region, Israeli involvement there would be perceived by Ankara as provocative. Israel prefers that US forces remain in Syria, but Erdoğan may present his dialogue with Öcalan and the Abdi-Sharaa agreement to US President Donald Trump as evidence that Turkey no longer threatens the Kurds, thereby justifying a US military withdrawal. Notably, in 2019, Trump nearly withdrew US forces from Syria but reversed his decision at the last moment. Without an American presence, and if northeast Syria indeed stabilizes, Ankara could shift its focus to expanding its influence in southern Syria—a development that might increase threats to Israel’s operational freedom.
Post Scriptum, 23 de març del 2025.
El politòleg kurd Ranj Tofik escriu avui a The Times of Israel, “Israel and the Kurds: Potential for a Strategic Relationship in Syria”.
The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria was a significant achievement for Israel, as it dealt a severe blow to the Iran-led axis and disrupted the Iranian supply route to Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, Syria’s future still presents challenges for Israel. After Assad’s fall, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) took control of Damascus and large parts of Syria, with Abu Mohammad al-Golani declaring himself president. This development poses a new challenge for Israel for several reasons: HTS is a designated terrorist organization, originating from Jabhat al-Nusra, the former Syrian branch of al-Qaeda. Its ideology is deeply hostile toward Jews and Israel. Furthermore, HTS’s rule is backed by Turkey and Qatar, both of which support Hamas and have expressed hostile rhetoric against Israel. In addition, Syria remains in a state of political, economic, and social instability, with multiple armed groups still active, making the new Syrian government just as unpredictable—and potentially as dangerous—as Assad’s regime.
Israel and the Kurds: Shared Interests
There are many armed groups in Syria, but three main and powerful factions control large areas of territory: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
HTS, as mentioned above, is designated as a terrorist organization. The Syrian National Army is a radical Islamist group affiliated with Turkey, and its stance on Israel aligns with that of HTS and other extremist factions.
Among these major groups, the SDF, which represents the Kurds, is the only one that does not harbor hostility toward Jews and Israel. Instead, it seeks to establish relations with Israel and holds a positive view of it. The SDF is also the only secular major group in Syria, as it is neither extremist nor religious. Additionally, the SDF is the primary US ally in Syria. Historically, Israeli-Kurdish relations have not been marked by hostility or tension; instead, the two sides have often shared mutual interests and a sense of sympathy.
Both Israel and the Kurds face the same two primary threats in Syria: extremist jihadist groups, which oppose both Kurdish self-rule and Israel’s security, and Turkey’s ambitions under President Erdogan, which threaten both Kurdish autonomy and Israeli regional interests. Given these shared concerns, establishing cooperation and relations between the two sides is extremely important. The Kurds could become a major and reliable ally of Israel in Syria—one that is both strong and influential. This alliance would provide Israel with a significant political advantage in Syria, countering the ambitions of both Turkey and the new Syrian government.
In return, the Kurds are in dire need of Israeli support in various areas. For instance, the Kurdish entity in Rojava primarily depends on the presence of American forces in Syria for its survival. In this regard, Israel could play a crucial role in persuading the Donald Trump administration to extend the presence of US forces. The withdrawal of American troops could serve as a green light for Turkey, HTS, and pro-Turkish militias to launch a large-scale and potentially devastating attack on Kurdish areas.
In such a scenario, the SDF may be compelled to seek support from any available party. This situation could provide Iran with an opportunity to reassert its influence in Syria by supporting the Kurds against Turkey and the Syrian militias—particularly since Iran can easily reach Kurdish areas in Rojava via Iraqi territory. This development would pose a serious threat to Israel, especially if Iran manages to reopen its supply route to Hezbollah.
In addition, developments in the Syrian arena may create an opportunity to establish a Kurdish-Druze alliance under Israeli-American sponsorship, given the many similarities between the Kurds and the Druze in the country. Both are minorities, both fear the new extremist Syrian government, and both are non-extremist groups with American-Israeli orientations. This alliance would connect the Druze region in southern Syria, near the Israeli border, with the Kurdish regions in north-eastern Syria. As a result, it would place the Syrian-Iraqi border under the control of this Israeli- and US-backed alliance, thereby preventing the return of Iranian influence to Syria and Lebanon through this border strip. Additionally, the alliance could include the Alawite minority, offering it protection from the new extremist Syrian government and distancing it from Hezbollah’s and Iran’s influence and interventions. It is also worth noting that the American military base at Al-Tanf is located in the aforementioned border strip, potentially facilitating the connection between the Druze and Kurdish areas. This, in turn, links the US base at Al-Tanf with other US military bases in north-eastern Syria.
To prevent the establishment of this strategic rapprochement, Turkey has taken numerous and sustained steps to keep Israel and the Kurds apart. It initiated peace talks with the Kurds in Turkey, which led to a statement by Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), calling for disarmament, the dissolution of the PKK, and the beginning of Kurdish cooperation with Turkey in the pursuit of peace. This, in turn, was a key factor behind the signing of the eight-point agreement between Mazloum Abdi, commander of the SDF, and Ahmed al-Sharaa, the interim president of Syria, under US mediation. Mazloum Abdi’s motivation was to distance the SDF from Öcalan’s call for disarmament, which had likely been made under Turkish pressure.
Nevertheless, there remains significant potential for Israeli-Kurdish cooperation, as the so-called peace process in Turkey and the fragile agreement between Mazloum Abdi and Ahmed al-Sharaa are both likely to collapse. To realize this potential, however, both the Israeli and Kurdish sides must take serious and urgent steps.
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