Jaume Renyer

per l'esquerra de la llibertat

9 de juliol de 2020
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La Xina comunista contra les societats obertes occidentals

L’objectiu del règim comunista xinès d’esdevenir la primera potència mundial comporta un conflicte multidimenional (econòmic, polític, ideològic, militar) amb la forma de civilització antitètica, la pròpia de les societats obertes occidentals. El món islàmic no és percebut com a rival de Xina estant, com ho demostra el fet que la repressió contra els uigurs no és incompatible amb l’adhesió dels estats musulmans que en són depenents. No hi ha cap que estigui en condicions d’aspirar a un lideratge mundial de l’islamisme, i en canvi n’hi ha uns quants que es presten de bon grat (Iran, per exemple) a fer de punta de llança contra l’enemic comú occidental.

S’ha escrit molt i encara s’escriurà més sobre aqueixa pugna entre la Xina comunista i els campions del món occidental, els EUA, que marcarà aqueix segle, comparant-la amb la que va enfrontar-los amb l’URSS a la segona meitat del passat. Aqueix cop no es pot parlar d’una segona versió de la guerra freda, entre capitalisme i comunisme, la Xina practica una forma de capitalisme salvatge contrari als principis democràtics. com analitzà ahir François Journat en aqueix article a Le Figaro: Pourquoi la confrontation entre les États-Unis et la Chine n’est pas une «nouvelle guerre froide» pel qual el duel xino-amèricà no s’organitza pas al voltant de veritables blocs, com en el passat enfrontaven Occident i el comunisme soviètic, sinó que hi pot haver aliances ideològicament invertides (per exemple, Vietnam pot fer costat als EUA) segons els interessos geoestratègics dels estats implicats:

Depuis son accession au pouvoir en 2013, Xi jinping veut imposer le système politique chinois en tant qu’alternative au capitalisme et œuvre pour une bipolarisation du monde. Fin mai, le ministre des Affaires étrangères Wang Yi enfonçait le clou en menaçant les États-Unis d’une «nouvelle guerre froide». Mais on peut penser que l’analogie avec l’expression inventée au lendemain de la deuxième guerre mondiale lors du conflit idéologique qui a opposé les États-Unis à l’URSS, est inappropriée.

Xi Jinping projetait dès le début de son mandat de défier les États-Unis. Il promettait devant le comité central «Nous devons nous préparer à une longue et rude période de compétition entre systèmes politiques» (propos extraits du livre Rouge vif de la sinologue Alice Eckman).

Mais la Chine n’est pas l’URSS et l’authenticité d’un discours capitaliste à Davos et communiste en Chine, s’avère très discutable. Par ailleurs, l’impérialisme chinois semble se diriger, si l’on se réfère par exemple à la répression violente des opposants ou au prélèvement forcé d’organes sur des prisonniers politiques, vers une forme de fascisme à la chinoise. Cette cruauté pourrait rappeler celle de l’Allemagne nazie ou évoquer les actes de cannibalisme commis au nom de l’idéologie du communisme pendant la révolution culturelle chinoise. Il n’est guère aisé de définir précisément idéologiquement le système politique de la Chine opportuniste de Xi Jinping mais il convient peu, même si l’URSS n’incarnait pas un modèle enviable de démocratie, si tant est qu’elle en fût une, de l’assimiler à la doctrine d’Alexeï Jdanov qui a théorisé la guerre froide. L’idéologue s’opposait au fascisme et vilipendait l’impérialisme américain. Sept décennies plus tard, la Chine commet des actes dignes des régimes fascistes les plus sanguinaires et son impérialisme constitue le plus grand péril pour les démocraties et l’humanité.

L’élection à la tête des États-Unis en 2017 d’un président protectionniste souhaitant réduire le déficit commercial abyssal proche de 400 milliards de dollars avec la Chine, a servi la stratégie du dictateur chinois. Celui qui semble vouloir endosser le costume d’empereur du monde a saisi l’opportunité de se mettre en scène dans un face à face qui le place sur un même pied d’égalité que Donald Trump et lui permet ainsi de se targuer auprès de son peuple, d’affronter le dirigeant de la première puissance mondiale. Cette posture favorise son objectif de bipolarisation inspiré du manichéisme de la guerre froide du siècle dernier et relègue les autres pays du monde au deuxième plan. L’agressivité du Parti communiste chinois durant la crise du Covid-19 et la déclaration de son ministre des affaires étrangères, dictée par l’Assemblée nationale populaire chinoise, indiquent que la Chine estime avoir franchi une nouvelle étape. Celle-ci semble désormais ne plus se soucier de l’opinion de pays devenus à ses yeux trop faibles ou dépendants de son économie pour protester.

L’utilisation par Pékin de l’expression «nouvelle guerre froide» vise à faire oublier sa gestion de la crise du Covid-19 au moment où l’opinion mondiale plutôt hostile compte ses morts et considère maintenant majoritairement que l’expansionnisme chinois représente une menace économique et un grave danger. Mais le système politique que la Chine prétend vouloir faire partager pour le bien de tous diffère du modèle marxiste-léniniste de l’URSS politique. Ce dernier emportait l’adhésion d’un nombre important de populations et de pays à travers le monde. Quel peuple souhaiterait aujourd’hui se placer volontairement sous le joug de la Chine ou d’un régime similaire conseillé par celle-ci? Bien que son projet séduise peu, le géant chinois tente néanmoins de multiplier les alliances susceptibles d’augmenter son influence géostratégique. On peut certes comprendre que la Russie souhaite renforcer des liens économiques notamment sur le plan énergétique et participe à des manœuvres militaires conjointes mais on peut douter que celle-ci suive la Chine aveuglement. Dans son voisinage, la Chine semble dresser contre elle une majorité d’Etats comprenant l’inde. Après plusieurs semaines de tensions, le premier affrontement militaire meurtrier depuis 45 ans a eu lieu le 15 juin 2020 à la frontière des deux pays.

Les imposants congrès chinois qui se drapent aujourd’hui d’idéologie, prônent «une destinée partagée pour l’humanité» et pourraient rappeler à certains égards, les grandes heures du communisme, mais la comparaison s’arrête là. L’assimilation du projet chinois à la foisonnante guerre d’idées qui a passionné durant un demi-siècle, semble présomptueuse. On assiste à une tentative de reproduction du conflit USA/URSS, mais on cherche en vain un goût pour la discussion démocratique ou une proximité philosophique de Xi Jinping et des dirigeants chinois avec les fameux bretteurs qui ont animé le débat majeur du XXème siècle autour de questions essentielles et de deux conceptions du monde.

Depuis les dissimulations à propos de la gestion chinoise de la crise sanitaire, la méfiance envers l’arrogant régime chinois s’est généralisée. Aussi, l’installation d’une prétendue «nouvelle guerre froide» à l’initiative de la Chine peut sembler très aventureuse. Certes, quelques pays dont ses alliés le Pakistan ou l’Iran, rêvent d’un monde post-occidental mais rares sont ceux qui préfèreraient le chaos ou le régime dictatorial prôné par la Chine à un système capitaliste qui demeure à ce jour globalement le plus fiable même s’il conviendrait d’en corriger les nombreuses dérives.

Post Scriptum, 30 de juliol del 2020.

La crisi del coronavirus mostra que la Xina és forta sobretot perquè aprofita les febleses del món occidental i en particular d’Europe, que renuncia als seus valors tot supeditant-los als dictats del despòtic règim comunista xinès. Això afirmen els economistes Jean-Philippe Delsol i Nicolas Lecaussin en aqueix article publicat abans d’ahir per La Figaro: “La Chine apparaît aujourd’hui comme un géant aux pieds d’argile».

Post Scriptum, 2 d’octubre del 2020.

Michel De Jaeghere, director de Le Figaro Histoire publica avui aqueix punyent article: «L’étrange impunité du communisme chinois»: La Chine de Xi Jinping offre aujourd’hui le spectacle de l’alliance paradoxale du capitalisme avec le totalitarisme. Elle bénéficie en Occident d’une indulgence à la mesure de celle qui a couvert les crimes du communisme chinois au temps de Mao Zedong”.

Post Scriptum, 23 de maig del 22021.

Giulio Meotti publica al Gatestone Institute el proppassat 30 de març aqueix punyent article en versió castellana: China compra a los académicos occidentales.

Post Scriptum, 10 d’agost del 2021.

L’atac del règim comunista xinès contre Occident té caràcter multidimensional: d’una banda activa la ciberguerra, com explica Pierre Coudurier, en aqueix article aparegut a Marianne el proppassat 22 de juliol, “La Chine dans le viseur des Occidentaux pour une cyberattaque, une première“, i d’altra banda, com explica Vincent Geny, també a Marianne el 27 del mateix mes, “Entrisme à l’université : “L’influence de la Chine s’étend à tous les degrés“.

Post Scriptum, 10 d’octubre del 2021.

Rauf Baker és l’autor d’aqueix report publicat el 16 de maig d’enguany al BESA Center: A 3-Pillar Strategy to Deflate China.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The West is facing an increasing challenge from China. There are several ways to meet that challenge: expanding, restoring, and deepening relations across different regions of the world; taking a revolutionary approach toward Russia; and, most drastically, acting like the Chinese.

In recent years, an “imperialist” economic shift toward China has been crystallizing in parallel with an ideological quake in the West’s vision of itself and role in the world. With Beijing penetrating African markets along with its steady expansion into Asia, its influence over the American and European economies has reached an unprecedented level. The Chinese are seizing the opportunity presented by the American retrogression and the preoccupation of major European powers with the challenges of terrorism and illegal immigration, as well as the COVID-19 crisis. The last of these was spawned by a virus that originated in China but that caused greater destruction, disruption, and distress abroad than at home.

The China of today is perhaps the greatest threat to the hegemony of Western liberalism to arise since the collapse of the Soviet Union three decades ago. The West is facing a double dilemma: how to deal with the Chinese menace on one hand, and how to manage increasingly tense relations with another global power— Russia—on the other. Both countries distrust the West.

The solution may lie in the dilemma itself: inoculate Moscow against Beijing. It is no secret that the countries do not enjoy warm relations. They were both ruled by communist regimes when the Americans successfully converged with the Chinese to repel the Soviets. This time, the equation can be inverted.

Given the situation, the West’s aggressive rhetoric toward Moscow is difficult to understand, as that approach is a gift to Beijing. Russia does not seem to pose a direct and imminent threat to the West, as China does. It lacks the soft power resources its neighbor enjoys. Unlike the Chinese, the Russians are not manufacturing electric cars that can take over the German auto industry or dethrone Tesla, the American pioneer. The Russians are not the ones seeding language and cultural institutes internationally, as the Chinese are doing through their Confucius Institutes. Nor is Russia the country that has become one of the most important sources of AI technology. It is Beijing, not Moscow, that is investing heavily in ports around the world and putting entire economies at its mercy as it barrels toward becoming the world’s number one economy in a few years. The demographic gap between the two countries is enormous, too: Russia’s population of 144 million is one-tenth that of China.

The contrast is also considerable on a less visible level. Where Russia is slow and even inert, China is expansionary, active, and voracious. Thus, the same shoe does not fit on either foot. The West may want to reshape its policy and favor a settlement approach with Moscow based on common interests, paving the way toward devoting joint efforts to confronting China.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), or the Asian NATO, can play a multi-front role in this regard in the Asia-Pacific region. This strategic forum, which is comprised of the US, Australia, Japan, and India, serves as a suitable platform from which New Delhi can become the new face of neo-Western imperialism. It is qualified to do so as a major political, economic, and military power.

There are several reasons why India should take center stage. It has historically volatile relations with China, for one thing—their border dispute has claimed thousands of lives—and New Delhi supports Tibetan independence. India is also a traditional ally of Russia that can play a rapprochement role between Moscow and the West.

Furthermore, India has an industrial capacity that can, with more development, rival that of China. India has the necessary infrastructure to be the West’s technological ally, which can help the latter reduce its technological dependency on China. New Delhi can also play a major role in the manufacturing and supply of vaccines and medicines in the post- COVID-19 era.

All of this would entail consolidating the Indian Ocean into the Pacific and bringing New Delhi into a league of allies. The current right-wing Indian government is steadily moving in this direction. It has deepened relations with the US, Australia, and the EU, has inaugurated a maritime partnership in the Pacific Ocean with France, and is laying the foundations for a strong strategic partnership with the UK.

The Quad’s other member, Japan, is gradually changing its military doctrine and engaging actively in Asian affairs. Within this framework, Tokyo, and possibly Seoul, are eligible for a comprehensive engagement on the Taiwan issue in the western Pacific. And while Beijing is expanding in the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia and investing in ports in Australia’s sphere of influence, Canberra, along with New Delhi and the Philippines (the other US ally), can halt China. The Australians are on good terms with Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, and Vietnam (the latter two are former French colonies, so Paris can lend a hand), and will be keeping a close eye on the evolving situation in Myanmar, where the Chinese are intervening.

Post-Brexit Britain now has a wider margin in which to design its foreign policy, as can be seen in the British government’s renewed talk about the doctrine of a “global Britain” and the need to continue its “historic mission” all over the world. India, Australia, and Canada have the advantage of special relations with London, their former colonial power, which should assist them as they share a trench against China.

The predicament in which the West may find itself is that China is turning into a refuge and source of the foundations upon which capitalism and consumerism live today. The West should look for more alternatives, in addition to India, so Beijing is not in a position to tighten its grip to the extent that abandoning it would amount to financial suicide. Reviving the economies of South American states, mainly Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela, is an essential step in this regard. These countries have great potential but were left on their own to face the repercussions of financial crises, the plummeting of oil prices, and COVID-19.

In Europe, the Nordic countries are key to promoting the centrality of Western civilization as a global cultural and civilizational hub. The European right wing, which is traditionally unfriendly toward the Chinese and more inclined toward the Russians, is gradually gaining ground—especially in Sweden, where right-wing parties are demanding alignment with the US and an end to neutrality.

Here, too, it is possible to capitalize on mutual suspicion, in this instance between Moscow and the Scandinavians. Giving the green light to the Nordstream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany, which passes near the Nordic countries, would be a valuable prize for Moscow, and would help convince a reluctant Germany to join the cause against Beijing. American assurances to Scandinavians and Russians in this context would defuse tensions and transform the Baltic region into a common ground that launches broader future understandings on matters such as the rights of Russian minorities in Eastern Europe and the Baltic, the issue of the US missile shield, and Moscow’s military build-up in the Kaliningrad exclave.

Apart from this, there is a fundamental strategic gain to be had from a Western-Russian rapprochement that includes the Nordic countries and Canada: shipping routes, specifically the Northern Sea Route and the Transpolar Sea Route. The first, which lies within Russia’s exclusive economic zone, could become a reliable new transport route from European to Pacific ports. Helping the Russians promote this corridor would have benefits for the West. The only hurdle is that Beijing hopes to benefit from this route as well by linking it with the Maritime Silk Road. With the Canadian-Russian row to defend sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route, the West and the Russians could reach a modus vivendi to share influence in both routes, with mutual guarantees that secure both sides’ long-term strategy and ensure that they achieve their goals.

The compromise could be to enable Moscow to maintain a constant freight rate for the Northern Sea Route, which would provide it with significant income, in exchange for a binding Russian pledge to secure the West commercially from excessive Chinese exploitation of the route. Both sides can eventually profit from the Transpolar Sea Route, as melting Arctic ice caps are likely to increase traffic in both routes and boost their commercial gains.

In order to rein in Beijing, one has to act like the Chinese. This means the West will have to make a profound change in its mentality and ideology. Western political liberalism has to find new definitions that may include ceasing to raise the issue of democracy with non-democratic states, or, to put it another way, to combat Beijing by using a Chinese weapon.

The only way the West will be able to thwart harmony between China and non-democratic, non-Western-style regimes is to overlook their human rights records to a large extent. Both history and current events have shown that the more such regimes are pressed on this issue, the faster they run toward China. The spread of democracy, which has been pivotal to the West’s foreign policy, must be deprioritized for the time being.

No doubt the West has enough shortfalls to fill the Pacific and Indian Oceans, but its global leadership is still, by and large, the “least bad” option when the alternative is handing the reins to a paranoid republic.

Post Scriptum, 23 d’octubre del 2022.

Els propòsits del líder suprem del PCX, Xi Jinping, els va exposar clarament quan al 2013 es va fer càrrec del partit, tal com assenyala Benedict Rogers a l’article “Chairman Xi. China faces many more years of totalitarian rule”, publicat al bloc del think Tank Persuasion el proppassat 17:

When the Chinese Communist Party appointed Xi Jinping as its General Secretary a decade ago, the country’s new trajectory was clear. In his first speech to the Politburo, in January 2013, Xi declared his ambition to build “a socialism that is superior to capitalism” and for China to “have the dominant position” against the West. This built upon the 2011 Communique from the Sixth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee of the CCP which outlined the Party’s plans to tighten control over culture, religion, literature, education, the media, the internet and society.

Over the next few years, the CCP went about refining Xi’s agenda. Perhaps the most important declaration of intent, “Document Number 9” from April 2013, provides an explicit attack against Western democracy, “universal values,” civil society, independent journalism and any questioning of the CCP’s past policies. In 2019, a further document emerged outlining the CCP’s intentions to tighten control of the education curriculum to ensure “feelings of loving the party.” Whatever criticisms one may make of Xi, one cannot deny that he made his agenda plain for all to see.

The problem is, the rest of the world was not listening. Just read the two reports by the UK Conservative Party Human Rights Commission, The Darkest Moment: The Crackdown on Human Rights in China 2013-2016 and The Darkness Deepens: The Crackdown on Human Rights in China 2016-2020At the time of these reports, especially the first, I and the few others involved in them were fairly lone, marginal voices, regarded as a nuisance by the political establishment in most Western democracies for highlighting human rights concerns which were inconvenient to their bilateral relationships with China.

 

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