Raül Romeva i Rueda

La flota pesquera europea puede volver a los caladeros marroquíes después de dos años sin faenar en esas aguas. El Parlamento ha aprobado el nuevo protocolo de pesca con Rabat lo que permitirá a un centenar de barcos españoles, andaluces y canarios sobre todo, reanudar la pesca allí. El sector pesquero y el gobierno celebran la decisión adoptada por la eurocámara. Hace dos años, el Parlamento Europeo rehazó el acuerdo pesquero con Rabat porque violaba, dijo, los derechos del Sáhara Occidental, un argumento que para la izquierda unitaria y los verdes, que han vuelto a votar en contra, sigue siendo válido. Es el asunto que hoy proponemos a debate entre Mato (PP), Sánchez (PSOE) y Romeva (ICV). (Minuto 10)

Paradoxalment, tot i ser avui el dia internacional dels Drets Humans, el Parlament Europeu ha votat per 310 vots a favor (i 204 en contra) un acord de pesca entre la UE i el Marroc que vulnera els drets del poble Sahrauí.

Contràriament al que tants diputats i diputades hem reclamat al llarg dels darrers anys (veure a continuació la meva intervenció d’ahir durant el debat en Plenària), l’acord inclou el territori ocupat del Sàhara Occidental. A dia d’avui, cap estat en el món reconeix la sobirania del Marroc sobre el Sàhara Occidental però tot i així el Marroc explota els recursos del territori com si fossin propis. L’aprovació de l’acord al Parlament Europeu farà que el Marroc rebi 160 milions d’euros i permetrà a la flota europea pescar en les aigües ocupades del territori. Concretament, es permetrà a 120 vaixells de pesca de la UE, la majoria espanyols, accedir a les aigües del Marroc i del Sàhara Occidental.

Des del grup de Verds/ALE hem criticat firmament aquest nou acord. Els eurodiputats i eurodiputades han amagat el cap sota l’ala al aprovar aquest controvertit acord. L’acord de pesca entre la UE-Marroc és l’episodi més vergonyós de  la política pesquera neocolonial de la UE. Segons l’acord, el govern marroquí concedeix il·legalment els drets de pesca a la flota pesquera de la UE per pescar a les aigües del Sàhara Occidental violant així les seves obligacions amb el dret internacional.

La setmana passada, el President del Parlament Panafricà, va escriure al seu homòleg del Parlament Europeu, el Sr. Schultz, per comunicar-li que l’acord amb el Marroc “soscavaria els esforços desplegats per les Nacions Unides i la Unió Africana per trobar una solució pacífica i duradora al conflicte del Sàhara Occidental “. L’ex assessor jurídic de l’ONU estableix que l’acord constitueix una violació del dret internacional.

Tal i com ha afirmat Erik Hagen, cap de la Western Sahara Resource Watch, “La comunitat sahrauí se sent terriblement frustrada. D’acord amb el dret internacional i l’opinió legal de l’ONU, la gent del territori ha de donar el seu consentiment per a les negociacions que impliquin el territori del Sàhara Occidental”. Contràriament, la Comissió Europea ha optat per ignorar els drets dels pobles del territori, i per negociar amb els ocupants.

Rabat s’ha compromès a invertir fortament al Sàhara Occidental per tal d’impulsar el desenvolupament i crear ocupació però la realitat ens mostra que el govern marroquí  ha sigut, cada vegada més, objecte de crítiques sobre violacions dels drets humans al territori en disputa, que considera una part integral del seu territori, i on les protestes separatistes no són tolerades. Concretament, el dissabte passat a la nit, el poble sahrauí va sortir als carrers de Aaiun, al Sàhara Occidental, per protestar contra els plans de la UE per explotació dels recursos pesquers del  territori. Els manifestants portaven pancartes i cridaven consignes contra l’acord de pesca. La policia va intervenir-hi, va reprimir els manifestants i va ferir-ne a diversos.

A continuació adjunto una peça amb diversos extractes del debat d’ahir, amb intervencions, entre d’altres, de Fraga (Ponent), Damanaki (Comissària) i servidor. 

Nota de prensa en CAST

El acuerdo pesquero entre la UE y Marruecos/ Sáhara Occidental

El Parlamento Europeo ignora las demandas del pueblo saharaui y respalda controvertido acuerdo

El Parlamento Europeo ha votado hoy a favor de un nuevo acuerdo de pesca entre la UE y Marruecos, después de haber decidido rechazar una propuesta de acuerdo hace dos años (*). Los Verdes han criticado la votación y el acuerdo ya que éste le permitirá a la  UE pescar en aguas del Sáhara Occidental a pesar de que el derecho internacional prohíba a Marruecos vender los recursos del Sáhara Occidental (1).

Después de la votación, el portavoz de la comisión de pesca y derechos humanos de Verdes/ALE,  Raül Romeva ha declarado:

“La Eurocámara ha mirado hacia otro lado e ignorado las demandas del pueblo saharaui para aprobar este controvertido acuerdo. El acuerdo de pesca entre la UE- Marruecos es el episodio más vergonzoso en la política pesquera neocolonial de Europa. Según el acuerdo, el gobierno marroquí concede ilegalmente derechos de pesca a la flota europea para pescar en las aguas del Sáhara Occidental, violando así el derecho internacional”.

“Además de la fragante violación de los derechos del Sáhara Occidental, el acuerdo no garantiza la sostenibilidad desde el punto de vista de la pesca y su base económica dudosa. Este acuerdo quedará como una mancha negra en la política exterior y de la pesca de la UE.”

(1) El Sahara Occidental está reconocido por las Naciones Unidas como territorio no autónomo.

(*) El informe Haglund , noviembre de 2011 A7 394-2011

COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE en FR- Strasbourg, le 10 décembre 2013

Accord de pêche UE-Maroc/Sahara occidental

Le PE fait fi des inquiétudes et soutient un accord controversé

Le Parlement européen a aujourd’hui voté en faveur d’un nouvel accord de pêche entre l’UE et le Maroc, deux ans après son rejet décisif d’une version antérieure.* Le groupe des Verts/ALE au PE critique l’issue de ce vote qui mettra sur pied un accord donnant droit à l’UE de pêcher dans les eaux du Sahara occidental malgré le fait, et en vertu du droit international, que le gouvernement du Maroc n’a pas le droit de vendre les ressources du Sahara occidental (1).

Commentant le vote, le porte-parole Verts/ALE sur la pêche, Raül Romeva, a estimé que:

“Les députés ont choisi de pratiquer la politique de l’autruche en votant cet accord controversé. L’accord de pêche UE-Maroc est l’épisode le plus honteux de la politique de pêche néo-coloniale de l’UE. Selon les termes de cet accord, le gouvernement marocain accordera illégalement des droits de pêche à la flotte de pêche de l’UE, l’autorisant à pêcher dans les eaux du Sahara occidental, alors qu’en vertu du droit international, il n’a pas le droit de le faire.

«En plus de la question du Sahara occidental, l’accord soulève les mêmes préoccupations concernant sa rentabilité douteuse et la durabilité des pêches. La réputation de l’UE en matière de politique étrangère et de pêche est désormais entachée par cet accord. “

(1) Le Sahara occidental est reconnu par les Nations Unies comme un territoire non autonome.

* Rapport Haglund, novembre 2011 A7 394-2011.

PRESS RELEASE in ENGL- Strasbourg, 10 December 2013

EU-Morocco fisheries agreement/Western Sahara

EP ignores major concerns and backs controversial agreement

The European Parliament today voted in favour of a new EU-Morocco fisheries agreement, two years after decisively rejecting an earlier version. The Greens criticised the vote and the agreement, which would give the EU the right to fish in Western Saharan waters despite the fact the government of Morocco has no right to sell the resources of Western Sahara under international law (1). Commenting after the vote, Green fisheries and human rights spokesperson Raül Romeva said:

“MEPs have today stuck their heads in the sand in voting to endorse this controversial agreement. The EU-Morocco fisheries agreement is the most shameful episode in the EU’s neo-colonial fisheries policy. Under the agreement, the Moroccan government illegally grants fishing rights to the EU fishing fleet to fish in the waters of Western Sahara, but it has no right to do so under international law.

“In addition to the issue of Western Sahara, the same concerns remain as regards the unsustainable nature of the agreement from a fisheries perspective and its dubious economic basis. This agreement will now remain as a major blot on the foreign and fisheries policies of the EU.”

(1) Western Sahara is recognised by the United Nations as a non-self-governing territory.

Font foto: Coordinadora Estatal de Asociaciones Solidarias con el Sáhara

Resolución del Parlamento Europeo sobre la situación en Siria (2013/2819(RSP))

B7?0423/2013

PROPUESTA DE RESOLUCIÓN

10.9.2013

tras una declaración de la Vicepresidenta de la Comisión / Alta Representante de la Unión para Asuntos Exteriores y Política de Seguridad

presentada de conformidad con el artículo 110, apartado 2, del Reglamento

sobre la situación en Siria (2013/2819(RSP))

Ulrike Lunacek, Malika Benarab-Attou, Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández, Rebecca Harms, Barbara Lochbihler, Raül Romeva i Rueda, Judith Sargentini, Bart Staes, Tarja Cronberg en nombre del Grupo Verts/ALE

El Parlamento Europeo,

– Vistas sus anteriores Resoluciones sobre Siria, en particular las de 16 de febrero de 2012, sobre la situación en Siria⁽¹⁾; 13 de septiembre de 2012, sobre Siria⁽²⁾; y 23 de mayo de 2013, sobre la situación de los refugiados sirios en los países vecinos⁽³⁾,

– Vista su Resolución, de 17 de enero de 2013, sobre las recomendaciones de la Conferencia encargada del Examen del Tratado sobre la No Proliferación en relación con la instauración de una zona sin armas de destrucción masiva en Oriente Próximo⁽⁴⁾,

– Vistas las Conclusiones sobre Siria formuladas por el Consejo de Asuntos Exteriores y el Consejo Europeo, respectivamente, desde el comienzo de la crisis a principios de 2011,

– Vista las observaciones del Presidente del Consejo Europeo, Herman Van Rompuy, antes de la Cumbre del G-20 de 5 de septiembre de 2013,

– Vistas las declaraciones de la Alta Representante, Catherine Ashton, de los días 21 y 23 de agosto de 2013,

– Vistas las declaraciones del Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas, Ban Ki-moon, después del ataque perpetrado en Ghutah el 21 de agosto de 2013,

– Vistas las Resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas 2059 de 20 de julio de 2012, 2043 de 21 de abril de 2012, y 2042 de 14 de abril de 2012,

– Vistas la Resolución de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas 377 de 1950 («Unión para el mantenimiento de la paz») y la Resolución 67/183 sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Siria,

– Vistas las Resoluciones del Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas sobre Siria, incluida la de 22 de marzo de 2013,

– Vista la declaración de ACNUR de 3 de septiembre de 2013,

– Visto el informe de la Comisión de Investigación Internacional Independiente de las Naciones Unidas sobre la República Árabe Siria, de 4 de junio de 2013,

– Vistos la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos y los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos y de derecho humanitario de los que Siria es parte,

– Visto el comunicado final de la reunión del Grupo de acción en favor de Siria (Comunicado de Ginebra), de 30 de junio de 2012,

– Vistos los Convenios de Ginebra de 1949 y sus protocolos adicionales, el Protocolo de Ginebra de 1925, y la Convención sobre armas químicas de 1993,

– Visto el Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Internacional,

– Vistos los informes desclasificados de los servicios de inteligencia publicados por las autoridades francesas, alemanas, británicas y estadounidenses a primeros de septiembre de 2013,

– Visto el artículo 110, apartado 2, de su Reglamento,

A. Considerando que cientos de civiles sirios resultaron muertos y heridos en Ghutah, en la zona oriental de Damasco, el 21 de agosto de 2013; que una serie de gobiernos, incluidos los de los EE.UU., los de algunos Estados miembros, Turquía y otros actores regionales, han acusado al régimen sirio de utilizar armas químicas contra su propia población; que estas acusaciones han sido rechazadas por el régimen de El Asad y puestas en duda por varios de sus aliados, entre ellos Rusia e Irán;

B. Considerando que un equipo de inspectores de armas químicas de las Naciones Unidas pudo recoger muestras y pruebas sobre el terreno, pero que solo unos días después del supuesto ataque con armas químicas la zona fue sometida a duros bombardeos por las tropas leales; que se espera que el equipo de investigadores de las Naciones Unidas informe en breve al Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas; que el mandato del equipo de investigadores de las Naciones Unidas consiste en determinar si se han utilizado armas químicas y no quiénes son los responsables de esa utilización; que el Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas, Ban Ki-moon, ha reclamado repetidamente que toda acción que se lleve a cabo se realice en el marco de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas;

C. Considerando que, basándose en los informes de los servicios de inteligencia, los dirigentes estadounidense, británico, francés y turco Barak Obama, David Cameron, François Hollande y Tayyip Erdo?an han acusado al régimen sirio de dirigir un ataque químico masivo en Ghutah y han declarado su determinación de llevar a cabo ataques punitivos limitados para exigir responsabilidades al régimen de El Asad por la utilización de armas químicas, impedir este tipo de comportamiento y reducir su capacidad de ordenar nuevos ataques; que estos líderes se han declarado dispuestos a lanzar estos ataques fuera del marco de las Naciones Unidas; que el Primer Ministro del Reino Unido, Cameron perdió en el Parlamento británico la votación de una moción para autorizar una acción militar, por lo que ha descartado la participación del Reino Unido en un ataque dirigido por los EE.UU.;

D. Considerando que el 1 de septiembre de 2013, la Liga Árabe pidió a las Naciones Unidas y a la comunidad internacional en general que ejercieran sus responsabilidades con arreglo al Derecho internacional y tomaran las medidas necesarias contra el Gobierno sirio;

E. Considerando que la Carta de las Naciones Unidas establece dos excepciones a la prohibición del uso de la fuerza: defensa propia y autorización del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas; que la doctrina de la intervención humanitaria no se ha reconocido en el Derecho internacional consuetudinario; que la doctrina de la responsabilidad de proteger» («responsibility to protect» R2P) obliga claramente a la comunidad internacional a adoptar medidas para proteger a una población contra las peores formas de delincuencia; que una acción vigorosa aprobada en el marco de la R2P también debe ser autorizada por el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas;

F. Considerando que Siria no es parte de la Convención sobre armas químicas que prohíbe el desarrollo, la producción, el almacenamiento, la transferencia y la utilización de armas químicas; que Siria se adhirió al Protocolo de Ginebra de 1925 relativo a la prohibición del empleo en la guerra de gases asfixiantes, tóxicos o similares; que en julio de 2012 Siria admitió estar en posesión de un arsenal de armas químicas;

G. Considerando que el 9 de septiembre de 2013 el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores ruso Serguéi Lavrov propuso persuadir al régimen de El Asad para que sometiese su arsenal de armas químicas a la supervisión internacional para su destrucción y se adhiriese a la Convención sobre armas químicas; que el Presidente estadounidense Barack Obama acogió con satisfacción esta propuesta como un posible avance decisivo;

H. Considerando que en los últimos meses la dramática situación de los derechos humanos, humanitaria y de la seguridad en Siria ha seguido deteriorándose, con una violencia armada que crece en intensidad y sigue extendiéndose por todo el país; que las tropas gubernamentales sirias han seguido utilizando sistemáticamente la fuerza contra zonas densamente pobladas; que el ala militar de Hezbolá, declarada organización terrorista por la UE, ha estado ayudando al Gobierno sirio desde la primavera de 2013; que, aunque en menor grado, también sigue llegando información sobre violaciones de los derechos humanos y del Derecho humanitario cometidas por las fuerzas opositoras; que el aumento de la proporción de fuerzas yihadistas entre la oposición militar constituye un motivo de gran preocupación; que los kurdos sirios se han visto cada vez más involucrados en el conflicto al sufrir ataques de ambas partes, los más recientes de los cuales entre el Partido de la Unión Democrática Kurda (PYD) y los grupos rebeldes islamistas en el norte de Siria; que el Consejo Nacional Kurdo firmó el 28 de agosto un acuerdo con la coalición nacional siria que garantiza los derechos de los ciudadanos kurdos, preparando el camino para su adhesión;

I. Considerando que, en septiembre de 2013, el Observatorio de los Derechos Humanos sirio estimó que desde el inicio del conflicto habían muerto 110 000 personas; que la mayoría de estas víctimas no eran combatientes;

J. Considerando que el conflicto sirio está afectando a la estabilidad de la región en su conjunto, extendiendo la violencia a los países vecinos, en particular Líbano, Jordania, Turquía e Irak, y que los agentes externos participan cada vez apoyando a una u otra de las partes en el conflicto;

K. Considerando que los países vecinos también están experimentando un drástico aumento del número de refugiados procedentes de Siria, que asciende actualmente a más de 2 millones de personas y a otros 4,25 millones de desplazados internos, de acuerdo con el Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (ACNUR); que más del 97 % de los refugiados sirios están acogidos en países de la región circundante, lo que supone una inmensa carga para sus infraestructuras, sus economías y sus sociedades; que las cifras del ACNUR de 3 de septiembre de 2013 muestran que hay 716 000 refugiados sirios en Líbano, 515 000 en Jordania, 460 000 en Turquía, 168 000 en Irak y 110 000 en Egipto; que los 525 000 refugiados palestinos de Siria son un grupo particularmente vulnerable afectado por el conflicto; que este grupo tiene pocas posibilidades de encontrar un refugio seguro fuera de Siria; que su huida a los países vecinos, especialmente a Jordania, representa un futuro riesgo de desestabilización;

L. Considerando que la UE es, hasta la fecha, el mayor donante y ha proporcionado a Siria más de 515 millones de euros en ayuda humanitaria a través de ECHO, y los Estados miembros de la UE, más de 493 millones de euros;

1. Condena el ataque que el 21 de agosto de 2013 causó cientos de muertos y miles de heridos entre los civiles sirios en el suburbio de Ghutah en Damasco; señala que este es el último ejemplo de las atrocidades cometidas desde 2011 en la masacre en curso en Siria;

2. Considera que, en caso de confirmarse, este recurso a las armas químicas por el régimen de El Asad o por cualquier otro beligerante exige una respuesta, que debe ser proporcional a la gravedad de este crimen aborrecible;

3. Destaca la importancia de mantener la prohibición mundial de utilización de armas químicas en virtud del Derecho internacional y que un acto de este tipo constituye una grave violación del Derecho internacional, concretamente un crimen contra la humanidad, que exige una respuesta;

4. Cree firmemente que la aportación de pruebas incontestables de la responsabilidad de la masacre de Ghutah resulta esencial para crear una respuesta unida y eficaz de la comunidad internacional a una de las mayores afrentas cometida contra la humanidad en décadas;

5. Insiste en la importancia de permitir a los inspectores de armas de las Naciones Unidas que concluyan su investigación y comuniquen sus conclusiones al Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas; lamenta que el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas no haya asumido hasta ahora sus responsabilidades como garante último de la paz y la seguridad internacionales; insta, en este sentido, a Rusia y China a que actúen de manera constructiva a fin de facilitar el rápido logro de una posición común sobre Siria para garantizar las medidas de protección de los civiles necesarias;

6. Insta a la Unión Europea y a sus Estados miembros, en particular los que son miembros del Consejo de Seguridad, a que presenten y apoyen una Resolución del Consejo de Seguridad en la que se remita la situación en Siria a la Corte Penal Internacional; insiste en que la Unión Europea y todos sus Estados miembros deben promover la exigencia de responsabilidades por todas las violaciones del Derecho humanitario internacional y de los derechos humanos cometidos por todos los agentes estatales y no estatales involucrados en el conflicto sirio, incluido el uso de armas químicas y el asesinato de prisioneros;

7. Subraya que toda intervención militar — con o sin autorización de las Naciones Unidas — en Siria tendrá inevitablemente consecuencias graves y altamente imprevisibles, y que no puede descartarse un agravamiento de la situación sobre el terreno, especialmente en lo que se refiere a la situación humanitaria;

8. Considera que no está justificada una intervención militar si no puede lograrse una verdadera protección o si las consecuencias de embarcarse en tal intervención pueden ser peores que si no se interviene; hace hincapié en que una intervención militar con objetivos de protección humana limitados no puede justificarse si con ello se desencadena un conflicto más grave;

9. Manifiesta su convicción de que ningún tipo de respuesta militar por sí misma disuadirá de la utilización de armas químicas en el futuro ni resolverá el conflicto sirio; considera, por el contrario, que la falta de una respuesta internacional armada a una utilización confirmada de armas químicas conlleva la espantosa perspectiva de una guerra química ilimitada en Siria y fuera de ella; reitera que solo un enfoque estratégico global que combine las dimensiones humanitaria y política puede poner fin a la violencia y las violaciones en masa de los derechos humanos, y promover una transición democrática en Siria;

10. Hace un llamamiento a todas las partes para que se reanuden los esfuerzos diplomáticos con arreglo al denominado «proceso de Ginebra II» para encontrar una solución en la que se respeten las aspiraciones democráticas del pueblo sirio, con la dirección activa del enviado especial de la Liga Árabe y las Naciones Unidas, Lakhdar Brahimi; subraya que las dos partes deben aceptar una participación de todas las partes sin condiciones previas; subraya que la UE debe esforzarse especialmente en tender la mano a Rusia e Irán y en promover un proceso de reducción de la tensión en toda la región;

11. Destaca que la situación en Siria requiere una estrategia enérgica, unida y rápida por parte de los Estados miembros de la UE; pide, por lo tanto, a la UE y a sus Estados miembros que convoquen un Consejo de Asuntos Exteriores extraordinario para examinar la situación en Siria y evaluar qué medidas podría tomar la UE para apoyar de manera más eficiente a las fuerzas democráticas de la oposición siria, proteger a los civiles y facilitar el diálogo y una estrategia común con otros actores internacionales como Rusia, Irán o la Liga Árabe;

12. Pide, a este respecto, al Consejo y a la Vicepresidenta de la Comisión/Alta Representante que tomen la iniciativa de solicitar que se celebre una reunión de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas sobre Siria para superar la actual situación de estancamiento en el Consejo de Seguridad, y que realicen todos los esfuerzos diplomáticos posibles para alcanzar una solución política; acoge con satisfacción y cautela la reciente propuesta rusa de poner bajo control internacional las armas químicas sirias, e insta al régimen sirio a que reaccione de manera positiva y sincera a la propuesta, que ofrece la posibilidad de un cambio decisivo en la crisis actual;

13. Reitera su firme apoyo al trabajo de la Comisión de Investigación Internacional Independiente sobre Siria y acoge con satisfacción su último informe;

14. Insta a la UE y a sus Estados miembros a que se muestren a la altura de sus responsabilidades humanitarias e incrementen su asistencia a los refugiados sirios; pide, en particular, a todos los Estados miembros que eliminen toda barrera que impida que los refugiados busquen protección en la UE; expresa su preocupación por la supuesta duración excesiva de los periodos de detención a que son sometidos los refugiados sirios en la UE; condena a aquellos Estados miembros, especialmente a Grecia, que están devolviendo a refugiados en violación del Derecho internacional y de la UE; solicita a la Comisión que supervise de cerca las prácticas de los Estados miembros y de Frontex, en particular en la frontera entre la UE y Turquía; pide a los Estados miembros que apliquen la Directiva 2001/55/CE del Consejo, de 20 de julio de 2001, relativa a las normas mínimas para la concesión de protección temporal en caso de afluencia masiva de personas desplazadas; pide a la Comisión que proponga con carácter de urgencia un régimen voluntario de reubicación permanente, a fin de permitir un mejor reparto de la responsabilidad y la solidaridad entre los Estados miembros; lamenta profundamente el hecho de que hasta la fecha se haya recibido solo menos del 50 % de los 3 300 millones de euros que necesita ACNUR para satisfacer las necesidades básicas de los refugiados; pide una mayor diversificación de los canales de ayuda humanitaria con el fin de reforzar el acceso a la ayuda internacional y la presencia sobre el terreno en zonas que se encuentran fuera del control del régimen; lamenta la suspensión del régimen egipcio de exención de visado en favor de los ciudadanos sirios, y pide que las autoridades egipcias respeten los derechos de los refugiados;

15. Cree firmemente que la UE debería aprovechar a largo plazo el clamor mundial sobre Siria para presionar por una reforma del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas en favor de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, y adoptar iniciativas diplomáticas audaces para hacer avanzar la agenda de la no proliferación, incluso mediante la promoción de un Oriente Próximo libre de armas de destrucción masiva, en particular celebrando la conferencia internacional tantas veces pospuesta sobre este tema, promoviendo la ratificación y la aplicación de los instrumentos internacionales correspondientes, abordando el uso continuado de fósforo blanco y de uranio empobrecido, e intensificando sus esfuerzos para reducir los arsenales químicos en todo el mundo;

16. Encarga a su Presidente que transmita la presente Resolución al Consejo, a la Comisión, a la Vicepresidenta de la Comisión/Alta Representante de la Unión para Asuntos Exteriores y Política de Seguridad, a los Gobiernos y los Parlamentos de los Estados miembros, a los Gobiernos y Parlamentos de la República Popular China y de la Federación de Rusia, al Presidente y al Congreso de los Estados Unidos, al Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas, al Secretario General de la Liga de Estados Árabes y al Gobierno y al Parlamento de la República Árabe Siria.

Els últims atacs a Gaza han provocat la mort d’un centenar de palestins, incloent nens i nenes, i 3 israelians. Coneixent que Israel va autoritzar el desplegament de 75.000 militars reservistes i bombardejar 80 llocs només durant la nit de diumenge a dilluns 19 de novembre, és evident que tot plegat podria provocar una preocupant escalada armada en tota la zona.

El president de l’Autoritat Nacional Palestina (ANP), Mahmud Abbas, va exhortar el poble palestí a resistir les agressions d’Israel de forma pacífica, i el Secretari General de Nacions Units va demanar l’alto el foc. Mentrestant, la UE, a través de l’Alta Representant, Catherine Ashton, ha reconegut el dret d’Israel a defensar-se dels atacs de Hamàs, que considera “inacceptables”. El bloc europeu també ha cridat a les autoritats israelianes a respondre de manera proporcionada (veure http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133530.pdf ). En la propera reunió del Consell, els ministres d’Exteriors analitzaran la situació.

Tenint en compte tot això, he plantejat les següents preguntes a la Comissió Europea:

Què vol dir concretament la Sra. Ashton amb ‘respondre de manera proporcionada’?

La invasió terrestre que planeja Israel, entra dins del seu concepte de “manera proporcionada”?

Bombardejar un territori ocupat, on viuen civils amb un armament altament superior, és considerat defensa per part de l’estat d’Israel?

Per què l’Alta Representant no demana l’alto el foc tal i com ho va fer el secretari general de l’ONU?

Quins contactes té l’alta representant amb la lliga de països àrabs i amb l’ANP?

Com pensa intervenir la diplomàcia europea per evitar més atacs d’Israel a Palestina?

Quines accions prendrà la UE per protegir els civils, israelians i palestins, que es troben en aquesta zona?

Foto: Fum després d’un atac aeri israelià al sud de Gaza. Font: EFE/EPA/Mohammed Saber

JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 

E.         whereas international human rights and humanitarian law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention, is fully applicable to the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip; whereas Israel is obliged, inter alia, to ensure in good faith that the basic needs of the occupied Palestinian population are met, administer its occupation in a manner that benefits the local population, protect and preserve civilian objects, and avoid the transfer of its own population into the occupied territory and of the population of the occupied territory into its own territory;

F.         whereas the recent EU Heads of Mission reports on ‘Area C and Palestinian State Building’, on East Jerusalem, and on settler violence, confirmed once more alarming and potentially irreversible developments on the ground in the areas concerned; whereas the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejects the claims made in the EU papers and has criticised the papers stating that they do not help to advance the peace process;

G.         whereas, since the 1995 Oslo Agreements, the West Bank has been administratively divided into three zones or areas; whereas Area C composes the largest portion of the West Bank territory; whereas social and economic developments in Area C are of critical importance for the viability of a future Palestinian state;

H.         whereas the Palestinian presence in the West Bank, with special regard to Area C, and in East Jerusalem has been undermined by Israeli Government policies, especially by the building and expansion of settlements; whereas Israeli settlements are illegal under international law and constitute a major obstacle to peace efforts while they are subsidised by the Israeli Government with considerable incentives in the fields of taxation, housing, infrastructure, roads, access to water, education, health care etc.;

I.          whereas Israel, in its ‘Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel’ of 1980, declared Jerusalem the complete and united capital of Israel, which is in contradiction with UN Security Council resolution 478 (1980); whereas the Council conclusions of 14 May 2012 reiterated again that a way must be found through negotiations to resolve the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states; whereas current developments in East Jerusalem, make the prospect of Jerusalem becoming the future capital of two states increasingly unlikely and unworkable in  practice; whereas East Jerusalem is increasingly detached from the West Bank while the Historic Basin within Jerusalem is increasingly detached from the rest of East Jerusalem;

J.          whereas, while Palestinians living in East Jerusalem represent 37 % of the population of Jerusalem and account for 36 % of the municipality’s fiscal revenues, only 10 % of the municipal budget is spent in East Jerusalem, with the provision of services being highly inadequate; whereas most Palestinian institutions, including the Orient House, have been closed by the Israeli authorities in East Jerusalem, creating an institutional and leadership vacuum in the local Palestinian population, which remains a key concern;

K.         whereas Palestinians living in East Jerusalem have a permanent-resident status which can only be transferred to children under certain conditions and is not automatically transferred through marriage, preventing spouses and children of many East Jerusalem permanent residents from living with their family members; whereas, on the other hand, approximately 200 000 Israeli settlers are living in and around East Jerusalem;

L.         whereas protecting the Palestinian population and its rights in the West Bank, with special regard to Area C, and in East Jerusalem is of the utmost importance for preserving the viability of the two-state solution; whereas the ongoing expansion of settlements and settler violence, planning restrictions and the consequent acute house shortage, house demolitions, evictions and displacements, confiscation of land, difficult access to natural resources, and the lack of basic social services and assistance are having a significant negative impact on the living conditions of Palestinians; whereas the economic situation in these areas, aggravated by the restrictions on access, movement and planning, remains a major source of concern; whereas, according to the annual ILO report, 53.5 % of young women and 32.3 % of young men between the ages of 15 and 24 in the West Bank are unemployed;

M.         whereas the Palestinian population in the West Bank, in Area C in particular, and in East Jerusalem faces serious water shortages; whereas Palestinian farmers are seriously affected by the lack of water for irrigation, which stems from the use of most of the water in question by Israel and by Israeli settlers; whereas the availability of sufficient water resources is essential to the viability of a future Palestinian State;

N.         whereas the separation wall built by Israel, which does not follow the Green Line, cuts off considerable parts of Palestinian territory both in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem; whereas the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice entitled ‘Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ of 2004 declared that ‘the construction of the wall being built by Israel (…), and its associated régime, are contrary to international law’;

O.         whereas Parliament has repeatedly expressed its support for the state-building efforts of President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and acknowledged and welcomed the success of the two-year state-building plan of Prime Minister Fayyad; whereas Area C and East Jerusalem should remain priorities in Palestinian national development plans, particularly in response to the sense of neglect felt by Palestinians living in these areas;

P.         whereas more than 4500 Palestinian prisoners, including 24 members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, around 240 children, and more than 300 Palestinian administrative detainees, are currently detained in Israeli prisons and detention centres;

Q.         whereas Arab Bedouins are indigenous people leading a sedentary and traditionally agricultural life on their ancestral lands and are seeking formal and permanent recognition of their unique situation and status; whereas Arab Bedouin communities, threatened by Israeli policies undermining their livelihoods and including forced transfer, are a particularly vulnerable population both in the occupied Palestinian Territory and in the Negev;

R          whereas, according to the report of the Displacement Working Group (DWG) which was published on 14 May 2012 and to the monthly Humanitarian Monitor of OCHA, more than 60 structures, including solar panels, water tanks and agricultural buildings, funded by the European Union and a number of its Member States, were destroyed by Israeli forces since January 2011; whereas more than 100 similar projects are under threat of demolition;

S.         whereas, on many occasions, including in the Council conclusions of 14 May 2012, the EU and its Member States have reiterated their fundamental commitment to the security of Israel, condemned in the strongest terms violence deliberately targeting civilians, including rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip, and called for the effective prevention of arms smuggling into Gaza;

T.         whereas Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement states that relations between the parties shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this agreement;

U.         whereas the blockade of and the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip has continued since 2007 despite numerous calls made by the international community for the immediate, sustained and unconditional opening of crossings for the flow of humanitarian aid, commercial goods and persons to and from Gaza, as also reiterated in the Council conclusions of 14 May 2012;

1.         Reiterates its strong support for the two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as capital of both states, and with the State of Israel with secure and recognised borders and an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable State of Palestine living side by side in peace and security;

2.         Welcomes the Council conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process of 14 May 2012 – which include conclusions on the West Bank and East Jerusalem – and reiterates that the EU will not recognise any changes to the pre-1967 borders, including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties, also welcomes the Middle East Quartet statement of 11 April 2012;

3.         Stresses that ending the conflict is a fundamental interest of the EU, as well as of the parties themselves and the wider region, and that this can be achieved through a comprehensive peace agreement, based on the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the Madrid Principles including land for peace, the Roadmap, the agreements previously reached by the parties and the Arab Peace Initiative; insists on the fact that any resulting resolution should not affect the dignity of either side; notes that the EU, as the largest donor to the Palestinian Authority and one of Israel’s major trading partners has instruments at its disposal to more actively encourage both parties to work towards a solution; calls on both parties to work together with the EU, which should pursue all efforts to resolve the conflict; recalls the applicability of international humanitarian law in the occupied Palestinian territory, including the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Prsons in Time of War;

4.         Stresses that direct negotiations leading to a two-state solution between Israelis and Palestinians should be resumed without delay and according to the deadlines called for by the Quartet, in order to overcome the unacceptable status quo; welcomes the exchange of letters between the parties initiated on 17 April 2012 and the joint statement by Israel and the PA of 12 May 2012;

5.         Expresses its deepest concern about developments on the ground in Area C in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, as described in the EU Heads of Mission reports on ‘Area C and Palestinian State Building’ of July 2011 and on East Jerusalem of January 2012,

6.         Stresses the importance of protecting the Palestinian population and its rights in Area C and in East Jerusalem, which is essential for keeping the viability of the two-state solution alive;

7.         Reiterates that all settlements remain illegal under international law and calls on the Israeli Government to stop all construction and extension of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and to dismantle all outposts erected since March 2001;

8.         Strongly condemns all acts extremism, violence and harassment committed by settlers against Palestinian civilians and calls on the Israeli Government and authorities to bring the perpetrators of such acts to justice and hold them accountable;

9.         Calls for full and effective implementation of existing EU legislation and EU-Israel bilateral agreements to ensure that the EU control mechanism – the ‘technical arrangements’ – does not allow Israeli settlement products to be imported to the European market under the preferential terms of the EU-Israel Association Agreement;

10.       Calls on the Israeli Government and authorities to meet their obligations under international humanitarian law, in particular by

            –          securing an immediate end to house demolitions, evictions and forced displacement of Palestinians,

            –          facilitating Palestinian planning and building activities and the implementation of Palestinian developments projects,

            –          facilitating access and movement,

            –          facilitating the access of Palestinians to farming and grazing locations,

            –          ensuring a fair distribution of water meeting the needs of the Palestinian population,

            –          improving access of the Palestinian population to adequate social services and assistance, in particular in the fields of education and public health, and

            –          facilitating humanitarian operations

            in Area C and in East Jerusalem;

12.       Calls for an end to the administrative detention without formal charge or trial of Palestinians by Israeli authorities, for access to a fair trial for all Palestinian detainees, and for the release of Palestinian political prisoners, with special regard for members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, including Marwan Barghouti, and administrative detainees; calls also for the immediate release of Nabil Al-Raee, the artistic director of the Freedom Theatre in Jenin Refugee Camp, arrested on and detained since 6 June 2012; welcomes the agreement reached on 14 May 2012 that allowed for the end of the hunger strike of the Palestinian prisoners and calls for its full and immediate implementation;

13.       Calls for the protection of the Bedouin communities of the West Bank and in the Negev, and for their rights to be fully respected by the Israeli authorities, and condemns any violations (e.g. house demolitions, forced displacements, public service limitations); calls also, in this context, for the withdrawal of the Prawer Plan by the Israeli Government;

14.       Encourages the Palestinian Government and authorities to pay increasing attention to Area C and East Jerusalem in Palestinian national development plans and projects, with the aim of improving the situation and living conditions of the Palestinian population in these areas;

15.       Stresses again that peaceful and non-violent means are the only way to achieve a sustainable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; continues to support, in this context, President Abbas’ policy of non-violent resistance and to encourage intra-Palestinian reconciliation and Palestinian state-building, and considers presidential and parliamentary elections to be important elements of this process;

16.       Reiterates its strong commitment to the security of the State of Israel; condemns any act of violence by any party deliberately attacking civilians, and is appalled by the rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip;

17.       Calls on the Council and the Commission to continue to support and deliver assistance to Palestinian institutions and development projects in Area C and in East Jerusalem with the aim of protecting and strengthening the Palestinian population; calls for improved coordination between the EU and Member States in this field; stresses that Israel must put an end to the practice of withholding customs and tax revenues belonging to the Palestinian Authority;

18.       Calls on the EEAS and the Commission to verify on the ground all allegations concerning the destruction of and damage caused to EU-funded structures and projects in the occupied territory, and submit the results to Parliament;

19.       Calls on the Council and the Commission to continue to address these issues at all levels in the EU’s bilateral relations with Israel and the Palestinian Authority; stresses that Israel’s commitment to respect its obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law towards the Palestinian population must be taken into full consideration in the EU’s bilateral relations with the country;

20.       Urges the EU and Member States again to play a more active political role, including within the Quartet, in the efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians; stresses again the central role of the Quartet and continues to support the High Representative in her efforts to create a credible perspective for re-launching the peace process;

21.       Reiterates its call for the immediate, sustained and unconditional lifting of the blockade of the Gaza Strip in terms of persons, the flow of humanitarian aid and commercial goods, and for steps allowing for the reconstruction and economic recovery of this area; calls also, with due recognition of Israel’s legitimate security needs, for an effective control mechanism preventing the smuggling of arms into Gaza; takes note of the decision of the Council to extend the mandate of the European Border Assistance Mission Rafah until 30 June 2013 and expects it to fulfil its tasks and play a decisive and effective role as regards the daily management of cross-border relations and the build-up of confidence between Israel and the Palestinian Authority;

22.       Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the EU Special Representative to the Middle East Peace Process, the President of the UN General Assembly, the governments and parliaments of the UN Security Council members, the Middle East Quartet Envoy, the Knesset and the Government of Israel, the President of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Legislative Council.

Foto: A map showing West Bank settlements produced by Peace Now

My yesterday’s speech on the Israeli raids against two palestinian TV Stations  (EP, 15.3.12)

And the resolution that we defended, as Greens/EFA:

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION with request for inclusion in the agenda for the debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law pursuant to Rule 122 of the Rules of Procedure on Palestine, the raids of the Israeli forces on Palestinian TV stations, by Margrete Auken, Nicole Kiil-Nielsen, Keith Taylor, Malika Benarab-Attou, Raül Romeva i Rueda, Ana Miranda, Rui Tavares, Judith Sargentini, Barbara Lochbihler, Jill Evans on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

B7 0160/2012

European Parliament resolution on Palestine, the raids of the Israeli forces on Palestinian TV stations

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions,

– having regard to the statement by the Spokesperson of the High Representative Catherine Ashton on the closure of two Palestinian television stations of 3 March 2012,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,

– having regard to existing agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and to the Oslo Accords (Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements) of 1993,

– having regard to Article 122 of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas, on 29 February 2012, Israel Defence Forces soldiers accompanying officials of the Israeli Ministry of Communication raided two Palestinian television stations, Wattan TV and Al-Quds University-affiliated Al-Quds Educational TV, and confiscated transmitters, computers, broadcasting equipment, cassettes, and administrative and financial documents; whereas several employees of Wattan TV were held for hours during this operation,

B. whereas the Israeli Ministry of Communication said following the raids that both television stations had been repeatedly warned that they used frequencies which violated agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, interfered with Israeli communication systems, and disturbed flight communications at Ben-Gurion International Airport in particular,

C. whereas the Palestinian Authority replied that Israeli accusations concerning the interruption of flight communications were false, that it had received no warnings from Israeli authorities, and that the two television stations were guilty of no violations of agreements between Israel and the PA, while it also underlined that the Israeli raids had breached these agreements, which require such issues to be resolved through consultation,

D. whereas Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad condemned the Israeli raid on the two Palestinian television stations as a blatant attack against the freedom of information which recalls Israeli practices in the beginning of the second intifada when occupation forces had raided and sabotaged many Palestinian media institutions, including Wattan TV, and said that the Palestinian response should entail immediate rebroadcast and continuation of work in both institutions,

E. whereas the European Union has worked with both Wattan TV and Al Quds Educational TV, which have been broadcasting for many years,

F. whereas intimidation of Palestinian media by Israeli authorities continues; whereas, on 20 November 2011, the Israeli Ministry of Communication ordered the closure of All for Peace, a radio station based in East Jerusalem and broadcasting from Ramallah in the West Bank; whereas Reporters Without Borders said that this radio station had been broadcasting programmes encouraging peace initiatives and dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians,

G. whereas the Oslo Agreement established an Israeli-Palestinian Joint Technical Committee to address any issues arising in the telecommunications field,

H. whereas Israeli raids on the two Palestinian television stations took place in Area A in the occupied Palestinian Territory, which is under Palestinian civilian and security administration and control,

1. Condemns the raid by Israeli Defence Forces soldiers and officials of the Israeli Ministry of Communication on Palestinian television stations Wattan TV and Al-Quds Educational TV and the confiscation of transmitters, computers, broadcasting equipment, cassettes, and administrative and financial documents on 29 February 2012;

2. Expresses its deep concern about the continuous intimidation of Palestinian media by Israeli authorities;

3. Supports the efforts of Palestinian authorities and the two television stations to restore all broadcasting equipment and continue interrupted broadcasting as soon as possible;

4. Calls on Israeli authorities to return all confiscated equipments and documents to the two television stations with no delay;

5. Calls on the Israeli authorities to fully respect the provisions of existing agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority when dealing with Palestinian media; stresses that the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Technical Committee, established by the Oslo Accords, is the adequate mechanism to resolve any disputes in the telecommunications field;

6. Stresses again that continuous raids by the Israel Defense Forces in Area A, which is under Palestinian civilian and military administration and control, in the occupied Palestinian Territory undermine the authority and credibility of Palestinian authorities and security forces in the population, puts in jeopardy the internationally recognised success of Palestinian state-building efforts, and considerably hinder efforts aimed achieving peace between Israelis and Palestinians;

7. Calls on the Vice President/High Representative, the Council, and the Commission to put the issue of Israeli intimidation of Palestinian media on the agenda of EU-Israel dialogue and to take this into consideration in EU-Israel bilateral relations; reminds again, in this context, of the EU’s obligation to ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies, as mentioned in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union;

8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Middle East Quartet Envoy, the Knesset and the Government of Israel, the President of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Legislative Council.

El text de la resolució que vàrem presentar, i defensar a les negociacions, els Verds/ALE és el següent: (segueix)

European Parliament resolution on Egypt: recent developments by Franziska Katharina Brantner, Hélène Flautre, Frieda Brepoels, Nicole Kiil-Nielsen, Margrete Auken, Raül Romeva i Rueda, Rui Tavares, Judith Sargentini, Barbara Lochbihler on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Egypt in particular of 17 February 2011 on the situation in Egypt, of 27 October 2011 on the situation in Egypt and Syria, in particular of Christian communities, and of 17 November 2011 on Egypt, in particular the case of blogger Alaa Abdel-Fattah,

– having regard to its annual reports on the situation of human rights in the world, and in particular to its resolution of 16 December 2010 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2009,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and to Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, to which Egypt is party,

– having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on Egypt, and in particular those on the violence the days before the parliamentarian elections, on 26 November 2011, on the continued crackdown on civil society in Egypt on 1 February 2012, on EU response on the football tragedy in Egypt on 2 February 2012, and her statement on 23 of January 2012 regarding the transferring power to civilian rule as quickly as possible,

– having regard to the Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions of 10 October 2011, having regard to the European Council Conclusions on Egypt on 23 October 2011,

– having regard to the Joint Communication on ‘A new response to a changing neighbourhood’ of the European Commission and the HR/VP to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions of 25 May 2011,

– having regard to the European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders,

– having regard to Rule 122(5) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas a committee to review civil institutions and NGOs aimed at tightening legal control on foreign funding of civil society organizations was announced in October 2011 and consequently a request was issued to the Central Bank to monitor all bank transitions of NGOs; whereas, at the same time, the state security prosecutor accused organisations that have illegally received funding from foreign sources of “grand treason” and “conspiracy” against Egypt through foreign agendas aimed at harming Egyptian national security; whereas the defamatory campaign against these organisations launched by the state-owned press served to de-legitimise and stigmatise them in the eyes of the public as actors acting against the interest of Egypt;

B.  whereas on 29 December 2012 Egypt’s public prosecution officers, with back-up from security forces, have launched raids on 17 national and international human rights and pro-democracy organisations based in Cairo, including the Arab Centre for Independence of Justice and Legal Professions (ACIJP), the Budgetary and Human Rights Observatory, the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute and Freedom House; whereas during the raids security forces confined staff to their offices, forbid them to make phone calls and seized laptops and other documents that prove these NGOs receive foreign funds without informing authorities;

C.  whereas twenty-seven human rights organizations describe these raids as an unprecedented campaign against political activists and rights entities after authorities had checked the bank accounts of the accused NGOs and Sameh Abou Zeid, the Minister of Justice-appointed judge presiding over this investigation, said evidence proves that several foreign and local NGOs have indeed received such unauthorized funds;

D.  whereas on 5 February 2012 Egyptian investigators filed criminal charges against 44 international and national civil society workers, including 19 Americans, 14 Egyptians, 5 Serbs, 2 Germans, 2 Lebanese, 1 Jordan and 1 Palestinian; whereas all of them face a travel ban preventing them from leaving Egypt; whereas the law being used to pursue these workers is one of the era of former President Mubarak, which the government had said it intended to repeal;

E.  whereas according to US Congress continued restriction of the activities and harassment of international and Egyptian staff will be looked at with great concern, particularly in light of Egypt’s annual U.S. military assistance of $1.3 billion;

F.  whereas the clashes between supporters of two rival teams, the local Al-Masry and Cairo based al-Alhy in Port Said stadium on 1 February 2012 revealed the death of at least 79 people and more than 200 injured under the indifference and lack of action of the security forces; whereas clashes demanding an end to military rule has amplified through out Cairo and other major cities in Egypt during several days, causing more victims; whereas security forces continue to use fire tear gas, birdshot and rubber bullets at protesters at close range causing deaths and serious injuries;

G.  whereas the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has failed to conduct an investigation into the reports of sexual assault of female protestors, including the so-called ‘virginity checks’ and death threats against female protestors; whereas civilians arrested under the emergency law continue being tried before emergency courts and military tribunals, which fall short of the minimum international standards of fair trial and the right to defence;

H.  whereas according to international and national organisations, there is no improvement in human rights protection in Egypt throughout the past 10 months of military rule whereby the SCAF has been accused of using life ammunition against peaceful civilians, of conducting activities hostile to fundamental freedoms, of

I.  whereas the European Union has several times called on an end of the violence in Egypt and stressed the necessity of transferring power to civilian rule as quickly as possible as accepted by popular referendum in March 2011;

J.  whereas no international institutions, including the EU, had been invited to observe the elections, except for a few local NGOs that received the authorisation on the eve of the elections day; whereas the international community pointed out some shortcomings and some observers reported problems outside the polling stations, but nevertheless the elections were internationally accepted as having taken place in a democratic way; whereas the SCAF eliminated the quota of 64 seats assigned to women in the People’s Assembly and limiting the gender issue to a requirement for the political parties to nominate at least one female candidate in their lists which resulted in only 1% of the members of the People’s Assembly being women;

1.  Expresses once again its solidarity with the Egyptian people in this critical and difficult period; Expresses its deep concern that the democratic transition to which the SCAF said it was committed to, has led to no democratic reform and an increasing crackdown on political dissent, freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; calls on the SCAF to respect the demands of the January 25 revolution namely to respect Egyptians’ aspirations to freedom, dignity and justice.

2.  Strongly condemns the ongoing crackdown on international and national human rights and pro-democracy organisations in Egypt and views it as a way to silence voices critical of ongoing human rights violations; considers that these attacks constitute a severe violation of the right to freedom of association, as provided in Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

3.  Urges the SCAF and the Egyptian government to immediately put an end to all forms of harassment or intimidation to which civil society organisations are subjected, whether direct or indirect, and especially to drop all criminal charges and stop the current media campaign against NGOs; urges the HR/VP to be vocal on the necessity for Egyptian authorities to adopt a new association law based on international human rights standards and in close consultation with NGOs and human rights and pro-democracy groups;

4.  Recalls on the Egyptian authorities the importance of giving civil society organisations the opportunity to play their role in building a sustainable democracy and calls on the Egyptian authorities to facilitate and allow in this regard foreign organisations, including political foundations, to continue their work on the ground without arbitrary restrictions;

5.  Calls for an independent, transparent and thorough investigation into the events of the Port Said stadium clashes that took place on 1 February 2012 as well as into the reports of sexual assault of female protestors, including the so-called ‘virginity tests’ and death threats against female protestors, which should be conducted by an independent and impartial judiciary, in order to hold all those responsible to account;

6.  Underlines the fundamental importance of civil society in any democratic society as well as the freedom of expression and media plurality and calls in this regard on the Egyptian authorities and the Egyptian People’s Assembly to fully associate and consult with civil society organisations in the law making process to improve the legitimacy and the efficiency of the law;

7.  Calls for further clarification about the constitutional process, its timeline and its democratic principles; calls on the Egyptian authorities to make sure that any constitutional provision is inclusive and leaves no possibility for discrimination of anyone in Egyptian society or puts any institution above the representatives of the People, including the right for the Members of the People’s Assembly to amend, adopt and reject the entirety of the national budget, including the budget of the ministry of defence;

8.  Stresses the importance of holding free, fair and transparent elections and encourages the EU and its Member States to continue supporting and assisting the Egyptian authorities, political parties and civil society in the efforts aimed at achieving this goal; calls on the SCAF to allow independent observers to witness and monitor the upcoming presidential elections;

9.  Points out that the widespread use of military and emergency courts contribute to increasing concerns regarding Egyptian authorities and represents a clear obstacle to the democratic aspirations of Egyptians; calls for the full lifting of the Emergency Law in accordance with the first demands of the January 25 revolution and with announcements made by the SCAF and the government before elections were held, including the lifting of the emergency law for suspects of acts of thuggery; urges the Egyptian authorities to end the referring of civilians to emergency and military courts and to guarantee them a just and fair trial in civil courts;

10.  Calls on the HR/VP, the EEAS and the Commission to guarantee that the respect for and the promotion of human rights and fundamental rights, including the independence of the judiciary and of the media, the lifting of the emergency law, the reinforcement of the role of the civil society and of women and the reform of security forces including the former state security apparatus, will be seen as priorities within the renewed ENP EU-Egypt Action Plan for 2012-2016 and condition further EU funding to Egypt;

11.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Per què demà votaré no a l’Acord comercial entre la UE i el Marroc relatiu a l’intercanvi de productes agrícoles i pesquers.