La República Popular Xina vol celebrar l’any 2049 el centenari de la seva fundació assolint l’objectiu d’esdevenir l’únic estat xinès incorporant Taiwan, assimilant la dissidència d’Hong Kong i reforçant l’ocupació del Tibet i reprimint les altres minories ètniques. I, alhora, arribant a ésser la primera potència mundial desplaçant els EUA d’aqueixa posició en tots els fronts. Ideològicament està bastint un model totalitari sense ideologia real, ja que el comunisme ha deixat de ser una concepció superadora del capitalisme, centrat en el control estatal de l’economia i de la població emprant tècniques digitals innovadores a una escala mai vista fins ara. Es tracta d’un estat-policial de nova generació que està experimentant a gran escala a la regió autònoma del Xinjiang per controlar i reprimir la població uigur per tal d’evitar el creixement de l’islamisme dins del seu territori.
El règim comunista ha bastit amb èxit fins ara un sistema econòmic capitalista contraposat a les societats obertes occidentals a les quals mira d’afeblir políticament i financerament, com en el cas europeu es pot constatar en aqueix report de George Tzogopoulos, “Can Europe Restrain China’s Influence ?”, publicat el 30 d’octubre de l’any passat al Perspectives Paper, número 630, del Begin Sadat Center.
El columnista de Bloomberg, Hald Brands, hi està publicant des del proppassat 10 d’aqueix mes una sèrie d’articles a la potència emergent xinesa començant per aqueix titulat: “China’s Master Plan: a global military threat“. Abans d’ahir proposava als EUA intensificar la presència militar naval arreu del món, propulsar la democràcia especialment al continent asiàtic estrenyent aliances amb els estats que ja ho són, com Corea del Sud, Índia i Japó.
Post Scriptum, 22 de juliol del 2018.
Mordechai Chaziza és l’autor del report “China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative”, publicat avui al Perspectives Paper número 900, del Begin Sadat Center.
Post Scriptum, 27 de setembre del 2018.
Tanner Greer publicà abans d’ahir a l’edició digital del Foreign Policy aqueix article sobre els preparatius militar de la Xina comunista per envair Taiwan: “Taiwan can Win a War With China“.
Post Scriptum, 7 de juliol del 2019.
Le Figaro va publicar el proppassat 2 d’aqueix mes una documentada infografia on exposa què pot passar quan arribi l’any 2047 en expirar el règim especial d’Hong Kong.
Post Scriptum, 5 d’agost del 2019.
Le Figaro publica avui una entrevista amb l’analista de estratègia Antoine Bondaz arran de l’aprovació recent del Llibre Blanc de la Defensa de la República Popular Xina que prioritza, un cop més, la lluita contra “el separatisme” a Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet i Taiwan.
Post Scriptum, 25 d’octubre del 2021.
L’Express recorda el cinquantè aniversari de la ignominiosa exclusió de Taiwan de les Nacions Unides: “Il y a 50 ans, la Chine supplantait Taïwan à l’ONU. Le 25 octobre 1971, l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU adoptait une résolution admettant la Chine de Mao Zedong au sein des Nations unies excluant ainsi Taïwan de l’institution. Dans la nuit du 25 au 26 octobre 1971, l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies adopte la résolution 2758 par 76 voix contre 35 et 17 abstentions. Elle stipule “le rétablissement de la République populaire de Chine dans tous ses droits et la reconnaissance des représentants de son gouvernement comme les seuls représentants légitimes de la Chine à l’Organisation des Nations unies, ainsi que l’expulsion immédiate des représentants de Tchang Kaï-chek du siège qu’ils occupent illégalement à l’Organisation des Nations unies et dans tous les organismes qui s’y rattachent”. Présentée par l’Albanie communiste, soutenue par la France, qui avait reconnu la République populaire de Chine dès janvier 1964, cette résolution évince Taïwan de la scène diplomatique internationale au profit de Pékin.
La crònica d’aquella jornada nefasta per Occident assenyala l’eufòria dels estats del “tercer món” per la victòria comunista, la desfeta americana i la decepció dels taiwanesos: “Le monde retiendra qu’à New York, le lundi 25 octobre à 23 h 17, l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies s’est souvenue que Pékin était en Chine. Après ce vote mémorable, Albanais, Algériens, Tanzaniens, Syriens, Cubains, Pakistanais et Indiens, ces derniers pour une fois d’accord, se sont serré la main, ont dansé de joie dans l’hémicycle or et bleu. “Ces gens-là se conduisent comme des Gardes rouges”, laissa tomber le vaincu, M. Chow Shu-kai, ministre des Affaires étrangères de Taïwan (Formose). Peut-être. Mais les “Gardes rouges” célébraient enfin le rétablissement de la logique et de la réalité.”
Post Scriptum, 27 de febrer del 2024.
“Aaron Sarin is a freelance writer living in Sheffield, currently focusing on China and the CCP”, segons consta en la seva presentació al tink thank Persuasion, on ahir hi va publicar aqueix article: Is China Capable of Attacking Taiwan? Xi’s intentions are clear, but China’s military is plagued with corruption.
In his New Year address on December 31st, Chinese President Xi Jinping laid out his plans for 2024. He spoke in the painfully repetitive patois that’s so natural to Communist Party members. “We will steadfastly advance Chinese modernization, fully and faithfully apply the new development philosophy on all fronts, speed up building the new development paradigm, promote high-quality development, and both pursue development and safeguard security,” he intoned. And then, moving abruptly from the vague into the terrifyingly specific, he said: “China surely will be reunified.”
If he is to be taken at his word, of course, this would imply a potential invasion of Taiwan, leading to the very real possibility of a global conflict. The island nation’s presidential election in January may have seemed a likely catalyst for this ambition, especially as Beijing’s least favourite candidate emerged victorious (Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party).
The signs were certainly ominous. As the election approached, Google Cloud’s cyber threat intelligence firm Mandiant reported a “substantial volume of espionage operations” carried out by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) against Taiwanese technology and critical infrastructure. Warplanes filled the Strait, PLA tugboats passed within three nautical miles of Taiwan’s southern coast, and Chinese high-altitude balloons flew directly over the island (the latter a new development).
But following Lai’s victory, things have been surprisingly quiet. In stark contrast to the aftermath of Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwanese visit back in summer 2022, when the PLA conducted live-fire artillery shooting and ballistic missile test firings close to the island, Beijing has launched no belligerent response. While it’s possible that Xi is simply waiting until May 20th when the new president assumes office, it would seem most likely that China’s huge internal challenges have stayed his hand.
Many commentators, myself included, have warned of the PLA’s military prowess. It turns out that appearances may have been deceptive. Recent U.S. intelligence revealed that a quantity of China’s formidable-looking nuclear missiles are actually filled with water. Doubtless the money for fuel had disappeared into pockets, based on widespread assumptions within the military that China will never really go to war and that no serious missile inspection would ever be carried out. An ex-officer, who fled to the United States in 2016, described the common practice whereby army personnel would take home chunks of missile fuel for use with their evening meals—it was particularly useful for keeping hotpots on constant boil. Comical details like these provide a rare glimpse of the PLA from the inside. They show a military culture thoroughly rotten and hollowed out by graft.
Perhaps, in its current state, the PLA is incapable of anything so ambitious as conquest. Xi’s recent purging of fifteen senior military figures may well have been a frantic response to the discovery of this chronic corruption. While Beijing has given an official reason for the removals, they come amidst reports of widespread graft investigations. If that is the case, then a rehaul of the PLA will now be underway, and Xi’s plan for invasion may well be significantly delayed.
The danger has not passed. During my private conversations with Chinese mainlanders over the years, I was told more than once—by individuals who claimed high-ranking Party connections—that the Taiwanese issue was Xi’s real reason for abolishing term limits in 2018. Historian Niall Ferguson heard the same thing from one of the president’s economic advisers. “Reunification” is of immense personal importance to Xi: it is the goal around which he intends to build his legacy. It’s an ambition that requires time and preparation, and the traditional ten-year tenure as President of the PRC and General Secretary of the CCP was simply insufficient. So he extended it. Xi’s mind was made up long ago: he will invade as soon as he can be sure of success.
But others in the Party leadership may not agree. Recall, for instance, PLA general Liu Yazhou, who found himself swept up in Xi’s “anti-corruption” drive two years ago. He received a suspended death sentence. Under Communist Party rule, those charged with crimes related to corruption are often being targeted for something else, and Liu was known to have written several times on the foolhardiness of attempting to take Taiwan by force. This was the real reason for his downfall: the public utterance of a position that directly opposed the president’s most cherished dream. Liu’s opinion may be a common one.
And then there is the Chinese public. According to a recent poll, a majority of mainlanders support the invasion of Taiwan, but how serious is such support? American expatriate Blake Stone-Banks recalls the mood back in August 2022, as Nancy Pelosi’s plane circled the island in cautious preparation for arrival at Taipei—an event that many believed could trigger war. He sat at a business dinner in eastern China, where nobody at the table could tear their eyes from their phone. Stone-Banks also observed a young couple on a date at a nearby table: as the evening progressed, they neither spoke to one another nor looked at each other. Romance was a distant memory. “The only sound in the restaurant was the bleep of the radar on their smartphones,” wrote Stone-Banks. The horrified, dry-lipped tension in that room does not suggest a public fired up by warlust.
China certainly has its hyper-nationalist extremists: mini-Xis who hunger for imperial expansion. I’ve had the personal misfortune to make their acquaintance. But a percentage of those who support the invasion may have been demonstrating a superficial performative rage.
Finally, there is the woeful state of the Chinese economy. This development could push China in two very different directions. On the one hand, Beijing is weaker now than at any point in years: it needs friends and foreign direct investment and it needs to find a way out of its economic challenges rather than bullishly beating the war drum. On the other hand, states facing decline have historically become more confrontational. Xi’s instincts incline him toward confrontation, but he lacks Vladimir Putin’s cavalier rashness. He will not make the move until he feels that the odds are decidedly in his favour. China’s corrupt military and the president’s own economy-tanking policies have set him back, buying time for both Taiwan and the world.
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